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Transnational Law as Socio-Legal Theory 
and Critique: Prospects for “Law and 
Society” in a Divided World 
PEER ZUMBANSEN† 
Bobbi: if you look at love as something other than an interpersonal 
phenomenon 
Bobbi: and try to understand it as a social value system 
Bobbi: it’s both antithetical to capitalism, in that it challenges the 
axiom of selfishness 
Bobbi: which dictates the whole logic of inequality 
Bobbi: and yet also it’s subservient and facilitatory 
Bobbi: i.e. mothers selflessly raising children without any profit 
motive 
Bobbi: which seems to contradict the demands of the market at one 
level 
Bobbi: and yet actually functions to provide workers for free 
me: yes 
me: capitalism harnesses “love” for profit 
me: love is the discursive practice and unpaid labor is the effect 
me: but I mean, I get that, I’m anti love as such 
Bobbi: that’s vapid Frances 
 
† Licence en droit, Paris; JD equivalent, Frankfurt, LL.M. Harvard; PhD (law) 
Frankfurt; Habilitation (law) Frankfurt. Chair in Transnational Law & Founding 
Director, Transnational Law Institute (TLI), King’s College London. Since 2018: 
Co-Director, TLI & Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. E. 
peer.zumbansen@gmail.com. A first sketch of the here outlined ideas was first 
presented at the 40th Anniversary Symposium of the Baldy Center for Law & 
Social Policy, University at Buffalo School of Law in November 2018. Many 
thanks to Priya Gupta for her critical and insightful feedback and to Baldy’s 
visionary Director, Errol Meidinger, and its magnificent coordinator, Laura 
Wirth for their accomplishments and for a very memorable and, indeed, inspiring 
gathering. Law & Society is dead. Long live Law & Society. 
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Bobbi: you have to do more than say you’re anti things1 
[M]odernization and globalization are powerful processes. We 
live in a period in which you easily get sushi in Denver, Colorado or 
Caracas, Venezuela (and it is popular in both cities); and you can 
find McDonald’s in Tokyo as well. American movies are popular in 
most of the world. So is rock-and-roll. Today you can go on the 
Internet from Madison, Wisconsin and purchase a recording by 
Bartok with the Berlin Philharmonic, conducted by Zubin Mehta. 
Museums in New York display African art. The world is, of course, 
hardly a global village; but if culture and technology converge, at 
least relatively speaking, does this have an impact on legal 
systems? Does it have an impact on legal culture? On all of these 
global and transnational issues, surely there will be far more 
interest, and research, in years to come.2 
The trick, of course, is neither to engage in some quest for the 
universal nor to approach each legal system as an exercise in 
butterfly collecting. Instead, it is to focus on connections, to keep 
turning the kaleidoscope so that as different legal and cultural 
systems appear we appreciate how differently they may arrange the 
connections among their parts.3 
I. DESPAIR 
The present moment. The weight of it. And, yet, its 
elusiveness. How does one capture it? How does one grasp 
the multiple strands of thoughts, discourse, events as well as 
objects that make up this particular moment? If not (or, no 
longer4) reaching for stars, are we hoping to catch butterflies 
or missiles, or, are we merely clasping at straws? The feeling 
of inadequacy is prompted by repeated experiences of 
ignorance and unawareness. So much unseen, so many 
 
 1. SALLY ROONEY, CONVERSATIONS WITH FRIENDS 172–73 (2017). 
 2. STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER 1018 
(2007). 
 3. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 12 (2006). 
 4. See Roberto Foa & Yascha Mounk, Across the Globe, a Growing 
Disillusionment with Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/opinion/across-the-globe-a-growing-disillus 
ionment-with-democracy.html. 
2019] PROSPECTS FOR “LAW AND SOCIETY” 911 
unheard.5 How helpful, then, is it to try to identify 
precursors,6 echoes7 and trajectories8 to connect the past 
with our day in order to draw lessons or insights? The 
approach to law and to a critique of its function in a changing 
and, structurally, deeply divided society,9 is and has been at 
the core of the “law and society” movement10 (LSM) and, with 
that, the question of what is and how to adequately capture 
the materiality and meaning of “context” has been both the 
elephant in the room and the elephant being felt by blind 
men. It is the unavoidable item which is present and the 
reason why everyone came, but it is something different for 
everyone. Aspirations abound, and so do law and society’s 
trials and tribulations.11 
 
 5. See CARL C. ANTHONY, THE EARTH, THE CITY AND THE HIDDEN NARRATIVE 
OF RACE passim (2017); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA xii–xvii (2017); Priya 
Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualizing Property After the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 73 MD. L. REV. 523 passim (2014). 
 6. Following the populist revival of the millennium’s second decade, a 
recurring theme in the anatomy of the present is “fascism.” See, e.g., WILLIAM E. 
CONNOLLY, ASPIRATIONAL FASCISM: THE STRUGGLE FOR MULTIFACETED 
DEMOCRACY UNDER TRUMPISM (2017). 
 7. ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT 
AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY passim (2018). 
 8. RACISM IN THE MODERN WORLD: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL 
TRANSFER AND ADAPTATION passim (Manfred Berg & Simon Wendt eds., 2014). 
For a fascinating history of neoliberal economists’ and policy makers’ 
instrumentalization of the state in the promotion of property and investment 
rights, see QUINN SLOBODIAN, THE GLOBALISTS passim (2018). For an equally 
disconcerting account of the origins of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 
many inopportune attempts to learn from it, see ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A 
DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD passim (2018). 
 9. Devon W. Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing Our 
Own, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1979 passim (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN JR., 
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)). For a 
different context of a divided society, see Marie Fox & John Morison, Lawyers in 
a Divided Society: Legal Culture and Legal Services in Northern Ireland, 19 J.L. 
& SOC’Y 124 passim (1992). 
 10. Lynn Mather, Law and Society, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 289 passim (Robert Goodin ed., 2011). 
 11. Jonathan Simon, Law after Society, 24 L. & Soc. Inquiry 143, 144 (1999) 
(reviewing STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL 
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To both capture and acknowledge the significance of the 
LSM today is an important task not only in light of the 
movement’s complex trajectories over time, but because its 
greatest value, admittedly, might be seen in the critical 
interventions that have been made through its networks and 
members across different political eras—themselves often 
drawn upon as historical frames for the positioning and 
elaboration of the movement’s central concerns. Underneath 
its focus on the relationship between “law” and “society”, its 
protagonists scrutinize the actual conditions of democratic 
representation, the substantive and procedural 
guarantees—and, their effectiveness—of “access to justice” 
and the role of courts in either advancing or stalling and 
resisting progressive claims for “social justice.” It is here, 
where LSM’s genealogies and manifold inheritances as well 
as variations and innovations since the anti-formalist and 
legal realist writing of the Nineteenth/Twentieth century 
turn, through the Critical Legal Studies movement, Critical 
Race Theory and on to post-colonial legal studies, “TWAIL” 
and LGTBQ critiques become visible. In many ways, then, 
LSM has been and continues to be both a crucial time-keeper 
of critical legal and socio-legal thought and a platform for 
collaboration and collective agency towards law reform and 
policy intervention. 
Meanwhile, such an ambitious understanding of law 
comes at a price. Viewing law as entangled not only in 
struggles for political and socio-economic rights, but as an 
important tool in the development of diverse initiatives of 
social critique and protest continues to expose the movement 
to challenging questions of method and epistemology. How, 
in other words, is “poverty” to be measured in a world before 
and after the welfare state, and since the financial crisis with 
its ambiguous fall out and post-crisis “normalization”? What 
does “equality” mean when studied in a context associated 
 
STUDY OF LAW (1995)) (“Yet as the twentieth century ends, this venerable project 
of working the intersection between law and the social finds itself not only 
incomplete but also increasingly uncertain about its identity . . . .”). 
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with austerity and neoliberalism but also with identity 
politics and religious pluralism? And, where are the 
reference points for a “political” critique of social “conditions” 
when “the state” has undergone and continues to be shaped 
by fundamental transformations in the relationship between 
public and private? If the LSM, arguably, focuses on the civil-
political and socio-economic circumstances of contemporary 
society, that very society has become ever more elusive to 
grasp—conceptually, empirically, and normatively. What 
does that mean for the movement’s concept of law? And, what 
role can be imagined for law in a neo-liberal, allegedly “post-
racial” and “post-feminist” world? 
The here offered reflections are inspired by the crucial 
interventions that the LSM and its tireless and fearless 
protagonists have and continue to make to precisely that 
larger question. Recognizing the impossibility to even 
remotely do justice to the variety of LSM scholarship, its 
members’ activism and engagement for the achievement of 
actual social and political change, their lobbying for law 
reform and advocacy of policy changes as well as their 
rebellious role in educational, governmental and other 
institutional contexts, my task here is a very specific one. In 
acknowledging the need to retrace, engage and adapt the 
analytical, conceptual and empirical toolkits of such bold 
law-based projects of social and political critique over time, I 
wish to draw attention to the time/place dimension in much 
of the LSM’s work by building on what is already an 
important concern within the movement: the question how 
to adequately think of law (and society) in an inter-
disciplinary fashion. The here proposed intervention, 
however, seeks to—momentarily—decenter the ordinary 
focus in much of the LSM’s scholarship on the “here and now” 
by critically challenging, first, what exactly is encapsulated 
in the “here”, second, whether we should assume that there 
is a shared experience of everyone’s journey to “now”, namely 
this present moment, and, third, who really is meant by and 
included in our constant recurrences to a “we”. In other 
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words, the three-fold question aims at interrogating our (!) 
existing frameworks with which we (!) a) identify problems 
as “problems,” b) explain these problems against a 
particular, yet potentially very one-dimensional and as such 
exclusionary and violent historical narrative and c) assume 
to be speaking in a universally acceptable and valid manner 
as representatives of an in fact much, much larger and 
infinitely more diverse group. Yes, we (!) are in trouble. 
There is, of course, nothing in these questions which 
speak to the epistemological crisis in post-but-not-yet-dead-
neoliberalism socio-legal studies that we (!) wouldn’t all come 
up with answers to—at some point. The immensely 
innovative and inter-disciplinary quality of LSM work up 
until the present day is nothing but a great harbinger of 
hope. So, if there was any need or, rather, justification at all 
for the here offered comments, then it might be found in 
relation to the LSM’s still dominant focus on the local. 
Ironically, the local context, a city, a segment of society, a 
region, a family or a corporation and its surrounding 
community, is its natural habitat and must be so, especially 
if we recognize the continued need to boldly challenge overly 
abstract and philosophical engagements with “law” through 
relentless offerings from the socio-legal scholar’s grab bag of 
messy detail, fuzzy boundaries and incongruent narratives. 
As those are regularly borne out of concrete examples, 
“fieldwork” and sometimes long-term “shadowing,” they do 
not lend themselves easily to generalization or conceptual 
elevation. But, among the side-effects of this attention to 
detail and of the concentrated and dedicated study of a very 
concrete, local instance of “law in action” is the risk of a loss 
of engagement with the experience and the work of other 
(socio-legal) scholars, who are engaged in just such studies 
in different places. Ironically, again, while the comparative 
lawyer will likely spend and end their life in the painful 
awareness of neither ever having “looked” far enough nor 
having ever fully “understood” the world beyond them, the 
socio-legal scholar might too often forego embarking on a 
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journey to connect with other socio-legal investigators in 
“far-away places” altogether. What might potentially get 
lost, then, is not only the exchange with one’s colleague over 
the parallels or differences between their respective pre-
occupations, their examples and their methods with which 
they scrutinize them. What is perhaps an ever greater 
opportunity not coming to fruition or too often being 
postponed until some unspecified “later date” is the shared 
experience of being confronted with phenomena that cannot 
be reduced nor fully explained by reference to the concrete 
context in which they become apparent. A transnational 
approach to socio-legal studies, then, would have to build on 
the hard-won insights among comparative lawyers regarding 
the difficulty to actually “understand” other people’s law but 
it would, at the same time, have to go beyond that. The task 
is not one of reducing one’s search in a “foreign” jurisdiction 
for similarities in, say, a legal rule, principle or even 
legislative initiative between “their” and one’s own law. 
Instead, a transnational socio-legal scholar must try to 
investigate the underlying, deeper as well as systematic 
conditions out of which legal challenges emerge locally. That 
requires, however, a distinct displacement and ironicization 
of what is accepted as “true” in one’s own legal (political—
philosophical—cultural) imagination in order to create a 
space in which competing, alternative explanations can 
become visible. At present, there is much that prompts such 
a transnationalization of socio-legal studies. The ubiquitous, 
world-wide despair over “the ways of the world” seems to 
translate itself into ever more accelerated as well as 
differently shaped forms of protest. Meanwhile, there is also 
a clearly wide-spread, again world-wide interest in recently 
published critiques of inequality, populism, racism and 
xenophobia as well as of an ever more comprehensive 
incorporation of the individual in globe-spanning data 
collection and surveillance infrastructures which, too, points 
to the existence of more systematic and spatialized causes for 
the local emergence of illness symptoms. Still, another 
compelling development concerns the important rise in 
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amplitude and importance of regional and local law & society 
scholarship and related projects and networks outside of the 
“home” base of North America and, to a different degree, 
Europe. These latter developments, for example in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, are noteworthy not least because 
they signal a distinct emphasis on the engagement with 
indigenous and subaltern as well as feminist and, more 
recently, LGTBQ-oriented legal critique, about which more 
will be said in parts III. and IV. of this paper , but also 
because they—as in the case of Latin America and Africa—
occur in connection with direct calls for scholars to write in 
their own, local language. With that, socio-legal scholars an 
activists are not only well positioned but also importantly 
being called upon to pay particular attention to the 
transnational dimension of their research agendas and their 
research methods, a crucial dimension of which will be to 
critically revisit and engage the epistemologies which 
underlie the conceptual frameworks now in circulation. 
 With reference, in particular, to the LSM’s continuing 
emphasis on both empirical and inter-disciplinary work, this 
paper proposes to complement and, hereby, challenge the 
issue complex of “place,” “time” and “authorship/agency” in 
contemporary law & society scholarship (and, activism) from 
a transnational legal studies perspective. For that purpose, I 
want to highlight what are already important, if not readily 
visible—transnational—dimensions of socio-legal studies 
today. By that I mean to make more explicit the ongoing 
transnational work within the LSM but also outside the 
movement’s core cohort as increasingly visible among an 
emerging generation of legal anthropologists and 
sociologists, geographers, political economists as well as 
cultural theorists, media and image scholars. A lot of the 
compelling and timely scholarship and critical engagement 
in this regard is not only explicitly ethnographic but also 
seeking to constantly problematize the tension between facts 
and norms, between the empirical base and the conceptual 
framing, between field work and epistemology. Outspokenly 
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claiming a foundation of post-colonial critique, these strands 
in contemporary law & society scholarship are—empirically, 
ethnographically speaking—infinitely more messy and 
entangled, embedded and “long haul” while they are—in 
terms of their underlying epistemes—distinctly critical vis-
à-vis the theoretical frameworks through which problems are 
otherwise regularly being framed, engaged and evaluated. 
As will hopefully become clearer through the course of 
this paper, this turn to the empirical and the epistemological 
is a core concern of the way in which I think we should today 
understand law as transnational. Such an approach does not 
attempt to draw a neat dividing line between “domestic” and 
“global” as allegedly two confined spaces. It’s distinctive 
methodological push is neither to argue for a resurrection of 
methodological nationalism nor for a nihilist collapse of the 
conceptual tension between the domestic and global. Instead, 
the here embraced idea of transnational law goes emphasizes 
the need to critically engage the conceptual and rhetorical 
frameworks through which these lines are either defended or 
attacked. Transnational law, in nuce, seeks to focus on the 
actors, norms and processes that are involved in generating, 
enforcing, adjudicating but also resisting law in a global 
context. While this “global context” does not demarcate an 
autonomous sphere of human interaction which exists in 
neat iso- and insulation from the nation-state, it is also one 
that cannot satisfyingly be defined or grasped through 
dualisms of public/private, state/society or 
domestic/global(international)—as long as these dualisms 
are taken as universally valid and, as such, are understood 
as elements of a universally “true jurisprudence.” By 
contrast, if one starts investigating any of such dualisms in 
light of a pluralist understanding of value systems, contested 
epistemologies and diverse-yet-violently-entangled histories 
of development, the contours of what I understand to be an 
emerging transnational jurisprudence begin to become 
apparent. In this vein, this paper is based on the assumption 
that such an approach to (transnational) law has a number 
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of important affinities with law & society. For one, such 
affinities are grounded in the awareness among LSM 
scholars that most of their analysis and their policy 
arguments will never be free of volatility and circumstantial 
relativity. Secondly, both transnational lawyer and socio-
legal scholar recognize the existential need to keep an ironic 
distance in relation to whatever legal idea or principle is 
being presented as “canonical” or “universal,” recognizing 
that the devil lies in the incoherent and intriguing detail 
which prompts both to look more closely, more critically and, 
indeed, more ironically. 
In what follows, we shall touch upon a small number of 
LSM “battle grounds,” instances that seem to represent, 
perhaps more poignantly than others, the ambitious task law 
& society scholars continue to set themselves. Meanwhile, 
these examples illustrate, quite directly, the already 
mentioned problematique of place and time, meaning that in 
each case the problem will inevitably look differently 
depending from which—and, whose—vantage point it is 
being assessed. Through a brief discussion of these examples, 
then, it might be possible to see how “the transnational” 
shines through what at first sight appears to be a wholly local 
and extremely momentaneous affair and concern. It is, then, 
through the interpenetration of the empirical and the 
conceptual which comes to the fore in each instance, that we 
can more clearly recognize how the usage of “law,” for 
example, in relation to “the state,” but also in distinction 
from “non-law,” needs to be updated and relativized. Such a 
deconstruction of the state-law nexus, on the one hand, and 
of the law/non-law distinction, on the other, emerges as a 
logical consequence of problematizing LSM’s habitual 
working assumptions against the background of post-
colonial theory. As we will see, the latter is as happily unruly 
and continuously evolving as LSM once was—and, arguably, 
might still be. And, the same, of course, is true of 
transnational law. As a methodological framework to 
critically engage law’s forms and functions in a global 
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context—geographically as well as epistemologically—
transnational law is being introduced to bring together these 
different strands of critique but also to highlight their 
specific qualities against the background of a new, post-
binary methodology of law in a global context. 
II. BATTLEGROUNDS 
Writing in 1916, the year Woodrow Wilson appointed 
him to the Supreme Court, the jurist Louis Brandeis 
observed: 
within the last fifty years, we have passed through an economic and 
social revolution which affected the life of the people more 
fundamentally than any political revolution known in history. . . . 
Political as well as economic and social science noted these 
revolutionary changes. But legal science—the unwritten or judge-
made laws as distinguished from legislation—was largely deaf and 
blind to them.12 
Ninety years later, Marc Galanter, a leading socio-legal 
scholar and one of the founders of LSM, described the 
movement’s take-off thus: 
LSS (law and social science) flourished at the intersection of legal 
optimism, academic expansion, and interdisciplinary enterprise. 
The Law and Society Association was founded in 1964, the year that 
the federal government launched the War on Poverty and embarked 
on an ambitious program of employing legal services strategically 
to improve the condition of the poor . . . .13 
The interest of scholars who associate with LSM the socio-
economic dimensions and the social impact and 
consequences of legal and regulatory governance has 
remained constant, but the foci of empirical study, research, 
and conceptualization have continued to evolve.14 
 
 12. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 463–64 (1916). 
 13. Marc Galanter, In the Winter of Our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, and 
Social Science, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 3 (2006). 
 14. See Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 L. & 
POL’Y 355 passim (1987). 
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Looking at the more recent context, snapshots from three 
different areas of socio-legal engagement—land rights, 
corporate governance and the war on terror—might further 
illustrate the diversity in the work being done. Since around 
the time of Galanter’s account, just into the start of the new 
millennium, the law and development and feminist legal 
scholar, Ambreena Manji, has offered a series of revealing 
insights into the continuously expanding land acquisition 
processes in vast parts of Africa.15 Analyzing, for example, 
the Ugandan land reform against the background of parallel 
contemporary legislation in other African states, Manji 
directs our attention to the gendered blind spots inherent in 
legal interventions to render land—seen as “dead capital”—
into an economically profitable asset, while failing to account 
for the inherent power asymmetries and structural 
disempowerment of women: 
A range of commercial and political hurdles stand in the way of 
protecting women. In the public sphere, commercial and political 
interests throw their weight behind attempts to liberate “dead 
capital.” Such efforts are parasitic upon, and threaten to worsen, 
unequal power relations within the private sphere of the family.16 
 
 15. Ambreena Manji, Whose Land is it Anyway?, AFRICA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
COUNTERPOINTS (June 2015); Ambreena Manji, The grabbed state: lawyers, 
politics and public land in Kenya, 50 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 467, passim (2012). See 
also Jampel Dell’Angelo et al., The Tragedy of the Grabbed Commons: Coercion 
and Dispossession in the Global Land Rush, 92 WORLD DEV. 1 passim (2017); 
Laura German et al., Contemporary Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Legal Deficiency or Elite Capture of the Rule of Law?, 48 
WORLD DEV. 1 passim (2013). 
 16. Ambreena Manji, Commodifying Land, Fetishising Law: Women’s 
Struggles to Claim Land Rights in Uganda, 19 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 81, 91 (2003); 
see also Ambreena Manji, ‘The Beautiful Ones’ of Law and Development, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 152, 167 (Doris Buss & 
Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (“The household is taken to be an undifferentiated 
unit in which the needs and interests of men and women converge.”). For a 
resounding socio-legal, feminist critique of family law that addresses the 
gendered blind spot identified by Manji as “family law exceptionalism”, see Janet 
Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: 
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 753 passim (2010), and, before them, see the seminal work by Frances 
Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
2019] PROSPECTS FOR “LAW AND SOCIETY” 921 
As she extends her critique into the conflicted zones of 
development, corruption, and investment driven 
transformations of local political economies, Manji does more 
than merely echo previous iterations regarding the split 
between “family” and “market” as, for example, famously 
explored in the early 1980s by Frances Olson, who observed: 
Given this simultaneous glorification and denigration of both the 
home and the marketplace, it should be no surprise that the sharp 
split between the two spheres had complex effects upon women. The 
market/family dichotomy tended to exclude women from the world 
of the marketplace while promising them a central role in the 
supposedly equally important domestic sphere. 
Manji is part of an empirically informed, ethnographic 
approach to law and society which benefits from what has to 
be understood as the transnationalization of legal 
ethnography and anthropology.17 Rather than engaging in 
legal comparison of particular doctrines or concepts between 
two or more countries, this scholarship focuses on the 
connections between regulatory transformations in different 
societal communities around the world, against the backdrop 
of an appreciation of migrating norms, standards, and 
movements of ideas, critique, advocacy, and intervention.18 
In the second example, we enter an area of similar 
conceptual turmoil and border-crossing/ignoring policy 
debate over the field’s underlying values: here, scholars of 
company law, corporate governance, and financialization 
 
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1500 (1983). 
 17. MARINA WELKER, ENACTING THE CORPORATION: AN AMERICAN MINING FIRM 
IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA passim (2014); Sally Engle Merry, Law, 
Anthropology, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357 
passim (1992); see Laura Knöpfel, CSR Communication in Transnational Human 
Rights Litigations Against Corporations (Transnational Law Inst., TLI THINK! 
PAPER 1/2019, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311545. 
 18. See, e.g., KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, 
DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS passim (2001). See also Sara Dehm, Accusing 
‘Europe’. Articulations of Migrant Justice and a Popular International Law, in 
PEOPLES’ TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-181 (Andrew Byrnes & 
Gabrielle Simm, 2017). 
922 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
have been struggling to resist claims about an “end of history 
for corporate law” in an effort to mount evidence against the 
alleged, all-around triumph of shareholder primacy in 
understanding the place of the modern business corporation 
in society.19 By scrutinizing the nonchalance of domestic 
corporate governance reform under the banner of creating 
attractive jurisdictions for global investors20 in relation to 
the detrimental effects the endorsement of shareholder value 
primacy has on workers, employment law and the 
constitutionally protected institutions of collective 
bargaining,21 critics have been emphasizing the global and 
transnational embeddedness of company law regimes in 
defense against global capital’s search for the most 
permissive legal framework.22 
Finally, the global “war on terror” has, in a relatively 
short and constantly accelerating time span,23 settled and 
 
 19. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 passim (2001). For a more “skeptical” take on this thesis 
and its supporting methodology, see Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia W. Williams, 
“Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Important, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 
1413 passim; Simon Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 
13 CORP. GOV. 11 passim (2005). 
 20. See, for example, the observation by the International Finance 
Corporation in their 2016 report: “Companies, regulators, and legislative bodies 
in markets at all stages of development acknowledge the value of good 
governance and the role it plays in heightening investor interest, improving 
access to capital, and strengthening markets.” INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
CORPORATION, FROM COMPANIES TO MARKETS: GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, vii (2016). 
 21. Zobaida Khan, Transnational Labour Governance: A Critical Review of 
Proposals for Linkage Through the Lens of the Rana Plaza Collapse in 
Bangladesh, 33 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 177, 182 (2018) (“Constant fear stemming from 
capital’s power to relocate to more hospitable places created an increased ‘risk of 
underbidding’ by labourers.”). 
 22. Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long 
Run, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR AND FINANCE 
CAPITALISM 15 passim (Cynthia W. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011); John 
C. Cioffi, State of the Art, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 passim (2000) (reviewing 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998)). 
 23. Lucas Walsh & Julien Barbara, Speed, International Security, and “New 
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become sedimented in uncountable legal/regulatory 
frameworks worldwide, revealing the domestic origins and 
drivers24 of what has expanded into a hyper-complex 
transnational disciplinary assemblage.25 Ill-defined and 
endlessly manipulable, the war on terror has since 
transformed itself into a highly effective justificatory 
rhetoric and vastly fragmented and decentralized control 
framework, blurring the boundaries between freedom and 
security, friend and enemy, domestic and global, and public 
and private.26 And, all of it is fed to and consumed by a global, 
24/7 “informed,” media public: 
The convergence of news and entertainment media conjures a 
seamless integration of communication, entertainment, commerce, 
and politics, through which the viewer is visually bombarded by a 
disorienting array of choice between news, fiction, “edutainment,” 
and “infotainment”—all of which are delivered instantaneously in 
the “here and now.” As news, “reality television,” fictions, and 
various levels of human and computer-mediated interaction take 
place through this electronic portal, the social and political impacts 
of the proliferation of virtual environments and multiple realities 
intensify.”27 
As such, the “war on terror” continues to assert itself as 
the cauldron in which the survival of civil liberties and the 
 
War” Coverage in Cyberspace, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 189, 193–94 
(2006) (“Today, war coverage in cyberspace has intensified the impression of a 
worldwide theatre of war in which conventional demarcations of fact and fiction, 
real and imagined, an entertainment and education are dissolved and infused by 
the weight, power, and immediacy of convergent mass media.”). 
 24. Michael J. Boyle, The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy, 84 INT’L 
AFF. 191 passim (2008); Stephen E. Flynn, America The Vulnerable, 81 FOREIGN 
AFF. 60 passim (2002); Alison Forrest, The Canada/U.S. Dynamic Post 9/11: 
Maintaining Sovereignty, Balancing Security Interests and Civil Liberties in 
Canadian Immigration Policy-Making (Osgoode Digital Commons, Research 
Report No. 4/2005, 2005), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/172. 
 25. Gavin Sullivan, Transnational Legal Assemblages and Global Security 
Law: Topologies and Temporalities of the List, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 81 
passim (2014). 
 26. Cian C. Murphy, Transnational Counter-Terrorism Law: Law, Power and 
Legitimacy in the ‘Wars on Terror’, 6 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THORY 31 passim (2015). 
 27. Walsh & Barbara, supra, note 23, at 196. 
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future of democratic, inclusive, and equitable societies 
remains at boiling point.28 Meanwhile, it has become another 
battleground for the conflict over what Upendra Baxi 
suitably calls the “postcolony”: 
“[P]ostcolony” now recurs as cruelly and poignantly as before 
though in a different narrative vein- via global “wars” on “terror”; 
and via hyper-globalizing world economic orderings which 
characterize different trajectories of myriad forms of “colonization 
without colonizers”. In this paradigm shift some new signifying 
practices/semiotics, genres and grammars more fully emerge; these 
re-articulate the “postcolonial” in complex and contradictory by 
phrase-regimes so well beloved of the United Nations and the 
European Union) [sic] which seek to so fully dissipate as well as 
remake the state of the “postcolonial” in such vastly staggering 
imageries of the developed” [sic], “developing”, “underdeveloped”, 
“least developed”; and now via the hype of even “emergent” 
formations such as BISA (Brazil, India, South African) frames of the 
postcolonial. These narratives of dissipation of the “colonial” into 
“postcolonial” afford little dignity of discourse for the non-European 
others.29 
Disturbingly, the materiality of the war on terror, itself 
having been and continuing to be a crucial target of critical 
deconstruction regarding its mind-bending impact on 
rhetoric and politics of “the normal” and “the exceptional,”30 
has become fused with and integral to the consolidation of 
exclusionary, racist, xenophobic, exclusionary, and anti-
democratic climate of neoliberal politics31 that render Carl 
 
 28. See, e.g., MOUSTAFA BAYOUMI, THIS MUSLIM AMERICAN LIFE: DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WAR ON TERROR passim (2015); Ramon Grosfoguel, The Multiple Faces 
of Islamophobia, 1 ISLAMOPHOBIA STUD. J. 10 passim (2012). 
 29. Upendra Baxi, Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India, 45 
VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE 178, 179 (2012). 
 30. E.g., Fleur Johns, Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 passim (2005); Anne Orford, Biopolitics and the Tragic 
Subject of Human Rights, in THE LOGICS OF BIOPOWER AND THE WAR ON TERROR: 
LIVING, DYING, SURVIVING 205 passim (Elizabeth Dauphinee & Cristina Masters 
eds., 2007). 
 31. Wendy Brown, Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein: Authoritarian Freedom in 
Twenty-First Century “Democracies”, 1 CRITICAL TIMES 60, 69 (2018) (“[T]he 
terrorist fuses with the job-stealer, criminal, and neighborhood malingerer, and 
where, conversely, false promises of restored economic potency mix with false 
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Schmitt’s anatomy of “friend and enemy”32 an almost 
simplistic blue print.33 This toxic mix continues to emit 
fumes so dense that they dull our senses and blind our vision. 
As a growing and deepening concern tries to express itself by 
decrying, in a manner that today sounds almost naïve, an 
 
promises of restored racial and gender supremacy. Porous boundaries of 
neighborhood and nation, eroded socio-economic status, and new forms of 
insecurity are braided together in a racialized causal logic and economized 
redress. As the Brexit slogan had it, ‘we will control our country again.’ Or the 
French again, ‘it is our house.’”); see also Sally Davison & George Shire, Race, 
Migration and Neoliberalism: How Neoliberalism Benefits from Discourses of 
Exclusion, 59 SOUNDINGS 81 passim (2015) (discussing pre-Brexit-Britain); 
Chaim Kaufmann, Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: 
The Selling of the Iraq War, 29 INT’L SECURITY 5 passim (2004). 
 32. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 25–26 (George Schwab 
trans., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1932) (“In contrast to the various relatively 
independent endeavors of human thought and action, particularly the moral, 
aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria which express 
themselves in a characteristic way. The political must therefore rest on its own 
ultimate distinctions, to which all action with a specifically political meaning can 
be traced. Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are 
between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable 
and unprofitable. The question then is whether there is also a specific distinction 
which can serve as a simple criterion of the political and of what it consists. The 
nature of such a political distinction is surely different from that of the others. It 
is independent of them and can only speak clearly for itself. The specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between 
friend and enemy.”). 
 33. See, for example, Edward Fairhead, Carl Schmitt’s Politics in the Age of 
Drone Strikes: Examining the Schmittian Texture of Obama’s Enemy, 22 J. 
CULTURAL RES. 39, 42 (2018) (“Displaying contemporary foresight for our politico-
legal present moment, Schmitt envisages that the aggressor will employ framing 
techniques which correspond inversely with such universal claims to justice and 
humanity, by marking the enemy as the ‘enemy of humanity’, which then allows 
parties ‘to treat entire states and nations as pirates.’”); see also Susan Schuppli, 
Deadly Algorithms: Can Legal Codes Hold Software Accountable for Code that 
Kills?, 187 RADICAL PHIL. 2, 3 (2014) (“The document [the U.S. Department’s of 
Defense’s 2011 ‘roadmap’ on the use of unmanned technologies] is a strange mix 
of Cold War caricature and Fordism set against the backdrop of contemporary 
geopolitical anxieties, which sketches out two imaginary vignettes to provide 
‘visionary’ examples of the ways in which autonomy can improve efficiencies 
through inter-operability across military domains, aimed at enhancing capacities 
and flexibility between manned and unmanned sectors of the US Army, Air Force 
and Navy. In these future scenarios, the scripting and casting are strikingly 
familiar, pitting the security of hydrocarbon energy supplies against rogue actors 
equipped with Russian technology.”) (bracketed explanation added) 
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“era of globalization,”34 but also an “age of global 
terrorism,”35 an “age of drone strikes”36 and an “age of 
anger,”37 this still is only a glimpse of the actual despair and 
frustration that has taken hold of progressive thinkers in 
what they experience as particularly dark times.38 If 
anything, these snippets are likely to only further the 
impression that we find ourselves in a particularly difficult 
moment where the design of policies appears to occur 
without a reliable set of references and anchor points but, 
instead, manifests itself in hyperbolic, divisionist rhetoric 
and polemic stand-offs. Categories and “markers” are being 
offered at a similar speed at which the phenomena, “trends,” 
and creeping institutional processes emerge which a set of 
struggling social and political theories is trying to depict.39 
And, still, despite all this and the uncanniness of much 
current analysis, it is important to keep an eye “on the 
clock”—lest we forget how history maps out, perhaps without 
rhyme or reason, those moments at which we stare 
“uncertainty” and “unpredictability” in the eye, but do so 
with the odd intuition that we will, after all, come up with an 
answer. Meanwhile, we remain entrapped in a specific set of 
perspectives, as we inevitably seem to rely on concepts and 
even terminologies that are as much children of their 
respective times as they are their victims.40 Breaking out of 
 
 34. See, for example, the reflections from a scholar of global business 
strategies regarding the claims of an “end of globalization” in MICHAEL A. WITT, 
THE END OF GLOBALISATION? passim (2018), https://knowledge.insead.edu 
/node/5046/pdf. 
 35. MYRIAM FEINBERG, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM passim 
(2016). 
 36. Fairhead, supra passim note 33. 
 37. PANKAJ MISHRA, AGE OF ANGER: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT (2017). 
 38. THINKING IN DARK TIMES: HANNAH ARENDT ON ETHICS AND POLITICS passim 
(Roger Berkowitz et al. eds., 2009). 
 39. For a brief yet illuminating survey of past critical theory work, see 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Counter-Critical Theory: An Intervention in Contemporary 
Critical Thought and Practice, 1 CRITICAL TIMES 5 passim (2018). 
 40. Compare John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 9 WORLD 
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such linguistic and conceptual frameworks requires a 
continuous, critical engagement with time capsules and with 
the vocabulary through which its inhabitants sought to 
understand themselves and the world around them.41 A 
crucial starting point for such an undertaking must be, 
however, the relativization of one’s accustomed perspectives 
on time, “history,” and of the modes through which one is 
inclined to define and endorse reference points, and to 
construct and rationalize the narrative of a particular 
trajectory.42 It is this type of relativization that lies at the 
heart of the here proposed project of a critical transnational 
legal theory.43 Resisting a narrative of “law as victim of 
 
POL. 473, 490 (1957) (“Hardly has a bipolar world replaced the multipower world 
of classical territoriality than there loom new and unpredictable multipower 
constellations on the international horizon. However, the possible rise of new 
powers does not seem to affect bipolarity in the sense of a mere return to 
traditional multipower relations; since rising powers are likely to be nuclear 
powers, their effect must be an entirely novel one. What international relations 
would (or will) look like, once nuclear power is possessed by a larger number of 
power units, is not only extremely unpleasant to contemplate but almost 
impossible to anticipate, using any familiar concepts.”), with Andrés Rivarola 
Puntigliano, 21st Century Geopolitics: Integration and Development in the Age of 
‘Continental States’, 5 TERRITORY POL. GOVERNANCE 478, 490 (2017) (“A 
particularity of the 21st century might be to consolidate the venue of the later 
part of the 20th century, where the path towards the construction of continental 
states and their lebensraum is no longer related to annexation, but rather occurs 
through what Carl Schmitt called ‘spatial supremacy’ and the control of 
grossraum . . . . In this sense, the return of geopolitics can also be regarded as a 
return to the 16th and 17th century’s notion of cuius region, eius economica.”). 
For Schmitt’s elaboration of the “Grossraum” theorem, see his THE NOMOS OF THE 
EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM passim (G.L. 
Ulmen transl., Telos Press 2006) (1950); see also PAUL J. BOLT & SHARYL N. CROSS, 
CHINA, RUSSIA AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS passim (2018). 
 41. For an insightful observation on how mid-twentieth century labor law 
would need to be transitioned and transformed from a passing welfare statist 
environment into an increasingly neoliberal realm, see HARRY W. ARTHURS, 
CONNECTING THE DOTS: THE LIFE OF AN ACADEMIC LAWYER 38–39 (2019). 
 42. I have made an earlier attempt at outlining this idea in: Peer Zumbansen, 
Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of 
Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008). 
 43. See a—hopefully—more elaborate pronouncement of this theory in: PEER 
ZUMBANSEN, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
HUMILITY (forthcoming 2019). 
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globalization,” as it has become a trope of twentieth-century 
Western legal thought,44 our here pursued aim is to create 
an imaginary space in which to take the task of “rethinking 
the law” (repenser le droit)45 seriously. In this light, there can 
be little that can remain unquestioned, whether it concerns 
a philosophical understanding of the “foundations of law,”46 
the association of law with “the state”47—understood almost 
as an immoveable, timeless entity, space, and institutional 
framework—or the separation of law and morality,48 law and 
 
 44. See, e.g., Jacques Chevallier, Mondialisation du droit ou droit de la 
mondialisation?, in LE DROIT SAISI PAR LA MONDIALISATION 37, 37 (C.A. Morand 
ed., 2001) (“Véritable « paradigme », rendant compte des transformations de tous 
ordres induites par l’émergence d’un « monde sans frontières », la mondialisation 
ne saurait dès lors manquer d’avoir une incidence sur le droit: ouvrant une brèche 
dans le monopole que les Etats - Nations s’étaient arrogés sur le droit, elle sape 
les fondements du droit moderne, tels qu’ils avaient été posés dans la pensée 
occidentale entre le XVIème et le XVIIIème siècles ; non seulement elle affecterait 
les formes et les modalités de la régulation juridique, mais encore elle obligerait 
à repenser le droit. Si le rythme de l’évolution reste incertain, en revanche le sens 
de la trajectoire est nettement tracé.”); see also Ralf Michaels, Welche 
Globalisierung für das Recht? Welches Recht für die Globalisierung?, 69 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 525, 536–37 
(2005) (“[D]as Recht muß mit allen diesen Erkenntnissen umgehen: Es soll den 
Markt regulieren, es soll die Macht von Staaten begrenzen (und ist doch zugleich 
auf diese Macht zu seiner Durchsetzung angewiesen), es soll die Gesellschaft 
regulieren, die Weltgesellschaft geworden ist, und es soll sich selbstverständlich 
von Einsichten der Ethik inspirieren lassen. Wie ist das zu bewerkstelligen?”) 
(Law needs to engage with all these insights. It is supposed to regulate the 
market, it shall curtail the power of states (but is, at the same time, depending 
on this power for its own enforcement), it shall regulate society, which has become 
a world society and, certainly, it is meant to be inspired by insights of ethics. How 
can that be done?) (author translation). 
 45. Chevallier, supra passim note 44. 
 46. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW (Wil Waluchow & 
Stefan Sciraffa eds., 2013). 
 47. Sidney Richards, Globalization as a Factor in General Jurisprudence, 41 
NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 129, 130 (2012) (“Although globalization is many things, it 
is perhaps most clearly a theoretical and practical challenge to various forms of 
state-centric thinking. Jurisprudence is at present, and has historically been, 
overwhelmingly state-centric. The term ‘law’ is synonymous with ‘state-law,’ and 
any form of inter- or transnational phenomena is derivative of state-law or state-
authority.”). 
 48. En lieu of so many others, see the inimitable H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1958) 
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politics,49 and “law as . . .” altogether.50 
Crucially, and as we—scholars, teachers, bloggers, 
activists—continue to struggle for a way to effectively, 
meaningfully, and impactfully navigate theory and practice, 
epistemology and intervention,51 we risk suffocation in the 
oxygen-less digital spaces in this “age of anger.”52 “Post-
truth,” “post-capitalism,” “post-democracy” are as much the 
ubiquitous bits and buzz-words in a hyper-accelerated global 
“debate” as they are offered as labels, perhaps, for new 
 
(“Contemporary voices tell us we must recognize something obscured by the legal 
‘positivists’ whose day is now over: that there is a ‘point of intersection between 
law and morals,’ or that what is and what ought to be are somehow indissolubly 
fused or inseparable, though the positivists denied it. What do these phrases 
mean? Or rather which of the many things that they could mean, do they mean? 
Which of them do ‘positivists’ deny and why is it wrong to do so?”). 
 49. Miro Cerar, The Relationship Between Law and Politics, 15 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 21 (2009) (“The relation between politics and law has both a 
progressive function and a safeguarding function. Law and politics, separately or 
together, both encourage and suppress the development of societal relations, 
while they both also function to bring about justice and order.”); Morris Cohen, 
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. QUART. 8, 8 (1927) (“Property and 
sovereignty, as every student knows, belong to entirely different branches of the 
law. Sovereignty is a concept of political or public law and property belongs to 
civil or private law.”). 
 50. Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law as . . .”: Theory and Practice 
in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039 passim (2011); see also Kirsten 
Anker, Law As . . . Forest: Eco-logic, Stories and Sprits in Indigenous 
Jurisprudence, 21 L. TEXT CULTURE 191, 192 (2017) (“In inviting us to eschew the 
‘law and . . .’ binary, and its modernist tendency toward functional and causal 
explanations, ‘Law As . . .’ asks us to embrace instead, through a syntax of simile 
or metaphor, the realm of image and imagination.”); Catherine L. Fisk & Robert 
W. Gordon, Foreword to “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519 passim (2011). 
 51. For a powerful invitation to think about the relation to critical thought 
and critical practice, see Harcourt, supra, note 39, at 15 (“The implications for 
counter-critical practice are significant. The effort must be to expose illusions and 
struggle for new meanings and interpretations—not for some truth or real 
interests, and not necessarily within the narrow confines of traditional critical 
praxis, but to struggle for new ways of governing and living together.”). See, in 
that regard, also the masterful book-length intervention by RATNA KAPUR, 
GENDER, ALTERITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A FISHBOWL (2018); and ROSE 
SIDNEY PARFITT, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REPRODUCTION: 
INEQUALITY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, RESISTANCE (2019). 
 52. MISHRA, supra note 37. 
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critical theory inroads. What this constellation illustrates is 
the deep orientation crisis to which we alluded at the start of 
this paper and which manifests itself in the fading light of 
structuring epistemologies and recognizable geopolitical 
outlines.53 And because, as a sign of the times, we are 
repeatedly and deafeningly urged to accept the unavoidable 
recourse to “emergencies,” to what is deemed inevitable and 
necessary,54 a careful and interdisciplinary scrutiny of 
“crisis” must remain a central concern.55 
Let there be no doubt, while the depth of this crisis is 
 
 53. PUB. POLICY FORUM, DEMOCRACY DIVIDED: COUNTERING DISINFORMATION 
AND HATE IN THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE 3 (2018) (“By and large, the internet has 
developed within a libertarian frame as compared, for instance, to broadcasting 
and cable. There has been until recently an almost autokinetic response that 
public authorities had little or no role to play. To some extent, the logic flows from 
a view that the internet is not dependent on government for access to spectrum, 
so therefore no justification exists for a government role. So long as it evolved in 
ways consistent with the public interest and democratic development, this logic—
although flawed—was rarely challenged. And so governments around the 
world—and tech companies, too—were caught flat-footed when they discovered 
the internet had gone in directions unanticipated and largely unnoticed.”). 
 54. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 6–7 (G. Schwab trans., MIT 
Press,1985) (1922) (“It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject 
of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty. The precise details of 
an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can we spell out what may take place in 
such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of extreme emergency and how 
it is to be eliminated.”); see also Countering Terrorism, NATO (July 17, 2018, 4:25 
PM), https://www.nato.int/ cps/ua/natohq/topics_77646.htm (“Terrorism in all its 
forms poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and 
to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat that 
knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international 
community must tackle together. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on 
improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and 
respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other 
international actors.”). 
 55. See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE. THE RISE OF DISASTER 
CAPITALISM (2007). In that regard, see also Craig Calhoun, A World of 
Emergencies: Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Order, 41 CAN. 
REV. OF SOC. 373, 376 (2004) (“It is as though there were a well-oiled, smoothly 
functioning “normal” system of global processes, in which business and politics 
and the weather all interacted properly. Occasionally, though, there emerge 
special cases where something goes wrong - a build-up of plaque in the global 
arteries causes a stroke, there is a little too much pressure in one of the global 
boiler rooms - and quick action is needed to compensate.”). 
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sensible to the quotidian newspaper reader and “ordinary 
citizen,”56 the efforts among different social sciences to 
counter the “populist backlash,”57 the “strange non-death of 
neo-liberalism,”58 “inequality,”59 and “climate change”60 
continue to take place in considerable distance from the 
rancor and rage on the streets. With little confidence in my 
ability to bridge this gap, this Paper still seeks to make an 
intervention from within a discipline (law) that perennially 
appears to be both caught up in and strangely aloof in 
relation to the socio-economic, cultural, political, and 
environmental crises that mark our time. “The law” which I 
intend to throw into the fray of this frightening moment is 
one which is fundamentally shaped by a socio-legal 
perspective on the relationship between legal and social 
ordering,61 and it is on this basis on which the different 
 
 56. Silvio Waisbord, The Elective Affinity Between Post-Truth Communication 
and Populist Politics, 4 COMM. RES. & PRAC. 17 passim (2018); Silvio Waisbord, 
Why Populism is Troubling for Democratic Communication, 11 COMM. CULTURE 
& CRITIQUE 21 passim (2018). 
 57. For a provocative analysis (as usual), see Eric A. Posner, Liberal 
Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795 passim (2017). 
 58. COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM passim 
(2011). 
 59. Celia B. Banks, The Sociology of Inequality, 14 RACE GENDER & CLASS 175, 
186 (2007) (“Uncovering the contributing factors to social inequality opens 
dialogue to discuss those factors, and, secondly, to identify how to eradicate 
them.”). 
 60. Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Climate of History: Four Theses, 35 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 197, 199 (2009) (“As the crisis gathered momentum in the last few years, 
I realized that all my readings in theories of globalization, Marxist analysis of 
capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five 
years, while enormously useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared 
me for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds 
itself today.”). 
 61. Susan Silbey, “Let Them Eat Cake”: Globalization, Postmodern 
Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 207, 230 (1997) 
(“Not only is there a noticeable structural homology between the narratives of 
globalization and liberal legalism, but the gap between law on the books and law 
in action revealed in much sociolegal scholarship can also be observed in the 
accounts and practices of globalization. Not only do we observe consistent 
contradiction—a gap between ideal and reality—but the same gap is produced: 
abstract formality and substantive concrete/experiential inequality.”). 
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layers and dimensions of law & society scholarship (and, 
activism) continue to emerge and become amplified, tested 
and contested. As such, lawyers, in their diverse professional 
orientations, are called upon to engage with this continuing 
conversation about the relationship between law and society 
and the practice and meaning of law in society.62 But, the 
challenge is no longer—if it ever was—adequately addressed 
by reference to merely more empirical work. The strident 
success of the law & economics school in catching a ride on 
the post-legal realist methodologies of impact-focused 
research, of “collecting the numbers” and getting down and 
dirty with facts, stats and trends teaches a lesson about the 
dangers of erecting dividing walls between theory and 
practice, policy programs and practice (“the way things 
work”). Without a critical assessment of the conceptual 
framework which shapes the tools of empirical data 
collection, there is always the danger that the proverbial, 
anecdotal example (the infamously “undeserving,” vacation 
travelling welfare recipient) is being elevated as proof of the 
validity of an entire world view. At question, then, is not only 
a continuation of detail-oriented and context-sensitive 
research into the actual operations of law (and, non-law) 
norms on the ground, but a sustained effort to question the 
way in which the “bigger picture” is drawn up in relation to 
the micro-level of analysis. On which epistemological and 
normative foundations, in other words, rests the conceptual 
framework which is operationalized for the identification the 
engagement of “the problem”? Where do the “markers” and 
“indicators” come from, what is the basis of standards and 
yardsticks by which the rule of law qualities of a particular 
state or governmental process is being evaluated? 
 
 62. Very insightful in this regard is the continuing conversation between 
David Nelken and Roger Cotterrell. See, e.g., ROGER COTTERRELL, SOCIOLOGICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE passim (2017); Roger Cotterrell, Law and Sociology: Notes on the 
Constitutions and Confrontations of Disciplines, 13 J.L. & SOC’Y 9 passim (1986); 
David Nelken, Blinding Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law, 25 
J.L. & Soc’y 407 passim (1998). 
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The developments alluded to in the beginning of the 
paper within the—seemingly disparate—subject areas of 
family law and women’s rights in the context of development 
and land rights, of corporate governance’s financialization 
woes, and the not only permanent but seemingly normalized 
“war on terror” provide a small glimpse on the battlegrounds 
that legal theory is not only drawn into but which it must 
boldly intervene in and help shape. As there is the beach 
under the asphalt, there are, beneath the surface of the 
clamor and twitter-propelled accusatory and exclusionist 
rhetoric, which deafens our senses today, the troubling and 
yet crucial ambiguities of “the formal,”63 “the political,”64 “the 
social,”65 and “the religious”66 and “cultural,”67 but also those 
 
 63. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, 
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 passim (1992); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 passim (1976); D. Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8634 passim (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes 
eds., 2001); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 passim (1932); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 passim (1931); Peer Zumbansen, Law After 
the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive 
Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 passim (2008). 
 64. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT passim (1988); Hilary 
Charlesworth, Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their Critics, 1994 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1 passim; Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the 
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 passim (1992). 
 65. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 passim (David M. Trubek 
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 66. BENJAMIN L. BERGER, LAW’S RELIGION: RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE 
CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM passim (2015). 
 67. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on 
the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975 (2005) (“[T]he technicalities of law 
are precisely where the questions that interest us actually are played out. 
Humanists should care about technical legal devices because the kind of politics 
that they purport to analyze is encapsulated there, along with the hopes, 
ambitions, fantasies and day-dreams of armies of legal engineers.”). 
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of “the global”68 and the “transnational.”69 These ambiguities 
express themselves differently in relation to their particular 
context and time, which suggests that they are markers of a 
progressive move in critical thought “from the domestic to 
the global.” This, however, might be the stereotypical view 
by a lawyer for whom the world has become infinitely 
complex and contested as it became globally connected. For 
a sociologist as well as for a socio-legal, critical lawyer, there 
is no such simple, linear trajectory from the local to the 
global, from the domestic to the international. For them, 
these ambiguities and the way in which they manifest 
themselves at different moments and across a wide spectrum 
of legal areas70 are a mere reflection of the ever-changing 
politics and geographies of law, which demand our 
interdisciplinary attention.71 Instead of finding that this or 
 
 68. See ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE. CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1996); Arjun Appadurai, How Histories Make Geographies: 
Circulation and Context in a Global Perspective, 1 TRANSCULT. STUD. 4 passim 
(2010). See also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and 
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 passim (2005); Martin Shapiro, 
The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 passim (1993); 
Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s 
Hierarchy, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 763 passim (1997). See also ELAINE FAHEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2018). 
 69. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW passim (1956); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 passim (1996); Gregory Shaffer, 
Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013); Alfred C. Aman Jr. 
& Carol J. Greenhouse, Transnational Law. Cases and Problems in AN 
INTERCONNECTED WORLD (2017); PEER ZUMBANSEN, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2020); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, 
Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898 passim (Jan M. 
Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
 70. See, e.g., H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 1 passim (1996); Gralf-Peter Calliess, The Making of Transnational Contract 
Law, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 469 passim (2007). 
 71. To the degree that such introspection and exposure are already 
problematic, here is a reference to two examples of my own continuing work on 
this: Peer Zumbansen, Manifestations and Arguments: The Everyday Operation 
of Transnational Legal Pluralism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM (Paul Schiff Berman ed.) (forthcoming 2019); Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Law, With, and Beyond Jessup, in THE MANY LIVES OF 
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that legal field is “domestic” in the sense that it emerges and 
evolves within an established institutional and procedural 
legal-political framework, a sociologically informed, critical 
perspective is always wary not only of how precarious and 
inherently unstable such a system is, but also to which 
degree, for example a domestic, local, or national legal 
system has always been embedded in particular socio-
economic, political, and cultural contexts which are distinctly 
not congruent with a jurisdictional space.72 This critique has 
been powerfully enhanced as well by subaltern, post-colonial 
and indigenous legal scholars in recent years, focusing on 
claims to land and “sovereignty.”73 
By consequence, it is the interdisciplinary engagement 
with the notion and materiality of context that opens our eyes 
for the way in which, on the one hand, the “spatialization” 
and, on the other, the “functional differentiation” of—to be 
sure, from our discipline’s perspective74—(legal-)regulatory 
areas emerge in multifarious forms. 
In the following second part, we shall reflect on the form 
 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S ‘TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW’ (P. Zumbansen ed.) (forthcoming 2019). 
 72. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 passim (1998); 
Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L.J. 534 passim (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., NOURA ERAKAT, JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF 
PALESTINE (2019); ALEXANDRE KEDAR ET AL., EMPTIED LANDS: A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 
OF BEDOUIN RIGHTS IN THE NEGEV (2018); see also PARFITT, supra note 51. 
 74. Drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s theory by which every social sub-system 
evolves according to a self-referential, cognitively open yet operationally closed 
rationality, see Martin Gren & Wolfgang Zierhofer, The Unity of Difference: A 
Critical Appraisal of Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems in the Context 
of Corporeality and Spatiality, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. 615, 620 (2003) (“[A]ll 
subsystems of society are able to deal with problems of their environment insofar 
as these problems can be selected by the specific programs and submitted to the 
specific codes of a subsystem. The capacity of the society to solve problems is 
basically provided and limited by its functional differentiation. Within modern 
world society there is no position available that could represent the society as a 
whole. By consequence, all multifaceted problems need first to be 
compartmentalised and translated into issues that functionally specialised 
systems can handle.”). 
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and the forum and fora for law in our age of global and local 
division. The short formula of “transnational law” (TL) will 
be introduced here, but obviously not to reference a 
longstanding, well established field or body of law. Instead, 
the use of TL for the present purposes is to investigate the 
different dynamics that shape law in the present context. 
III. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS CRITICAL LEGAL PROJECT 
There is little reason to believe, at least at first and 
second glance, in transnational law’s inherently normative 
stance. In fact, if anything, transnational law is not 
commonly taken as the label for a progressive, critically 
minded legal theory or legal concept. Rather, the opposite 
appears to be the case. As TL is most commonly seen in close 
relation to the demographics and institutional formations of 
globalized business interests,75 its re-imagination as a 
“critlaw” project is anything but intuitive. The evidence of 
the “actors, norms and processes”76 that are usually 
associated with TL surely points in that direction. But what 
distinguishes the here understood project of transnational 
law as a critical methodology of law in a global context from 
references to law as “transnational” or “global,” which are 
made in response to the obvious legitimation problems that 
nation state-based concepts of the rule of law, representative 
democracy or parliamentary law-making have continued to 
 
 75. Arturo Ortiz Wadgymar, Neoliberal Capitalism in the New World 
Economy, 8 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 295, 306 (1994) (“Globalization is the 
game of free play for powerful transnational interests, associated with one 
another or linked to second-class partners among local bourgeoisies, operating 
without regulation from national governments, and seeking to take control of 
international markets.”). 
 76. For an elaboration of the A-N-P triad as a central pillar of a transnational 
legal method, see Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: 
Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 passim (2012). For a recent application of this concept, see 
for example Kinnari Bhatt, New ‘Legal’ Actors, Norms and Processes: Formal and 
Informal Indigenous Land Rights Norms in the Oyu Tolgoi Project, Mongolia 
(Transnational Law Inst., TLI THINK! PAPER 63/2017, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995505. 
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run into for the past twenty or so years, is the way in which 
the former seeks to epistemologically bridge the domestic 
and global experiences of and with law. The distinctive 
proposal of such a critical project consists in, first, 
recognizing the immense variety of such domestic legal 
trajectories in order to, then, challenge an uncritical 
assumption of what is in effect only a particular—namely 
one’s own—experience of a history of state and society and 
public and private as being generalizable. Resisting this 
generalization is the more important the more the particular 
and idiosyncratic account is likely to be mobilized and 
canonized as a quasi-universal account of how law (and, the 
state) became “globalized.” 
So, when we review what circulates as a typical account 
of the state’s and its law’s infelicitous fate in an era of 
globalization, it is important to keep in mind where such a 
story comes from and how it is being disseminated. To the 
degree that the typical account unfailingly advances an all 
too often bleak mixture of anxiety and reminiscence, we may 
better appreciate how it originates from within a reference 
context in which—over the course of the short, yet turbulent 
twentieth century—the rule of law and, along with it, the 
welfare state, had become both a standard and a yardstick. 
But, as these dimensions of a governmental system resting 
on an intricate relationship between legality and legitimacy 
were universalized as well as exported, transplanted and 
globally imposed, their particularity—in time and space—
had been rendered invisible. As a result, not only would the 
advent of “globalization,” that is the world-wide expansion of 
hyper-accelerated financial transactions, movements of 
goods, services and people and the seemingly “ungovernable” 
proliferation of private and quasi-public regulatory actors be 
painted in colours of destruction and destabilization in 
relation to the state as sovereign, but perhaps even more 
problematically, the colonial background of the rise of the 
Western state to become the driving power of 
international/global affairs had never been made part of this 
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narrative. Consequently, the dominant tale of the state and 
the law’s experience of globalization became one in which the 
erosion of sovereignty and of an alleged loss of the state’s 
regulatory prerogative were front and center, but the 
historical underpinnings of the (Western) state’s place in the 
world were typically not included in the story line. The 
charged nostalgia regarding the Western welfare state’s 
inability to continue to maintain the thus-far enjoyed living 
standards for its constituents made immense “sense” and 
had a strong attraction as it continued the still largely 
ahistorical and de-contextualized idealization of the state 
and its law—at least until further notice. That notice, 
however, could not be delayed infinitely. With decolonization 
gaining increasing momentum since the 1960s, with the 
political and cultural backlash against the totalizing “war on 
terror” from the early 2000s onwards in both the Global 
South and North and in light of the significant geopolitical 
transformations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the days 
of the “American Century” have for a while now seemed 
counted. Questions such as “What’s Next?” pose themselves 
with the same urgency as those that ask “In Whose Name?” 
What that means is that many of the popular accounts of 
“globalization” are (or, should be problematized) as contested 
in the same way that post-colonial theory has pointed out 
with regard to notions of “progress,” “civilized nations,” etc. 
And that implies a considerable urgency in expanding the 
usual time-lines that are applied in relation to the “state in 
an era of globalization” by critical, transnational 
historiographies of the state’s colonial, imperialist historical 
trajectories. Only then will the contextual and relational 
operation of the state and its already mentioned formal and 
material attributes become more clearly recognizable 
against a background much of which is often-times hidden in 
darkness. Shedding more light on these neglected and 
ignored parts of the storyline is a major achievement of post-
colonial historiography, cultural and legal theory. 
While I will address the consequences of the post-colonial 
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critique of existing state-law “before” and “after” 
globalization in the last part of this paper, it seems worthy 
to return to the “typical” state-and-globalization account for 
a moment. A closer look at the way in which the challenges 
to the nation state are being depicted in the current moment 
helps in understanding the ideological stakes that are 
involved in challenging this very narrative. If, in effect, the 
current state, along with its associated qualities such as a 
constitutional foundation, a functioning electoral system and 
a working judiciary as well as a recognized list of political 
and socio-economic rights and guarantees towards the state, 
is taken as role model and benchmark, this explains not only 
the continued attraction of the state-as-victim-of-
globalization narrative; furthermore it makes more visible 
how this narrative serves to insulate the state and its alleged 
“problems” from a much more comprehensive critical 
engagement with the capitalist system of which the present-
day state (and, its law) are an integral part. A critical 
scrutiny of the larger economical and ideological context in 
which the history of the state unfolds would help to better 
understand the frustration that unavoidably accompanies 
any present-day efforts to “ameliorate” difficult economic 
conditions or “mitigate” inequalities. As it stands, however, 
accounts of the state and its law in an era of globalization, 
including of its more recent variations of re-nationalization, 
cling to established narratives of how the state evolved and 
what trials and tribulations it had to undergo as it fought to 
secure safety nets and equal rights against the corroding 
forces of global markets. Such laments only too rarely place 
the state within a story about the role of political agency in 
facilitating and enhancing the very developments, the state 
is depicted to be the helpless victim of. 
How is the story being told, and why does it matter? In 
light of a large-scale shift to private governance regimes, 
both as a domestic manifestation of post-Western welfare 
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state transformation,77 on the one hand, and the fast 
expanding realm of transnational private regulatory 
governance,78 on the other, the state as a confined 
governance unit is being contrasted to a continuously 
changing landscape of newly emerging power brokers, 
private norm makers, hybrid, public-private expert 
committees, standardization bodies, consultancies and think 
tanks, which are deeply invested in new and extremely 
fragmented games of norm making and the creation of 
powerful regulatory regimes outside of the state’s traditional 
frameworks of governmental political administration.79 It 
comes as no surprise that the growth and expansion of 
private regulatory governance in institutional and spatial 
dimensions continues to be the subject of extensive 
normative analysis. What is noteworthy, however, is the 
changing scope of such critique—as it unfolds in response to 
an increasingly complex and multilayered regulatory 
“assemblage”80 which is but prompting the creation of an 
 
 77. With regard to the U.S., see, for example, Mimi Abramovitz, The 
Privatization of the Welfare State: A Review, 31 SOC. WORK 257 passim (1986), 
and Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 passim 
(2001). For a focus on Germany and the UK, see Lutz Leisering, Pension 
Privatization in a Welfare State Environment: Socializing Private Pensions in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, 28 J. COMP. SOC. WELFARE 139 passim (2012). 
 78. Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental 
Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain 
Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503 passim (2002); Philipp Pattberg, 
The Forest Stewardship Council: Risk and Potential of Private Forest Governance, 
14 J. ENV’T & DEV. 356 passim (2005). 
 79. Critical insights in this regard have been provided by scholars in the field 
of International Relations and (Global) Political Economy. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & 
WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN 
THE WORLD ECONOMY passim (2011); PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS passim (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999); 
 80. Gilles Deleuze, in an interview in 1980, reframed his idea of “assemblage” 
thus: “In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations of 
bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole 
regimes of signs.” GILLES DELEUZE, TWO REGIMES OF MADNESS 177 (David 
Lapoujade ed., Ames Hodges & Mike Taormina trans., 2007). Partly drawing on 
Deleuze’s work on assemblage, sociologists, political theorists and lawyers have 
more recently been applying the concept to the multifarious and non-unified 
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altogether new or fundamentally revamped analytical 
vocabulary and conceptual toolkit to capture its object of 
analysis.81 While the proliferation of these new actors and 
their increasingly diversified and deepened involvement in 
regulatory activity, innovation, and intervention82 is the 
stuff of sociological scrutiny, it is the consideration of the 
newly emerging materialities of regulatory norms and the 
wide-eyed acknowledgement of the varied types of processes 
through which such norms come into existence, are 
disseminated, enforced, and contested, which prompts the 
development of interdisciplinary conceptual frameworks to 
grasp the advanced degree of complexity in the here 
surfacing forms of global social organization.83 
But, because the breathtaking speed and scope of 
functional and geographical differentiation of legal 
regulatory regimes is a hallmark of law in a complex global 
context, it is helpful to place present-day analysis in 
 
governance regimes in what systems-theory scholars term functionally 
differentiated systems of specialization. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY – 
AUTHORITY – RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES passim (2006). 
 81. Gavin Sullivan, Transnational Legal Assemblages and Global Security 
Law: Topologies and Temporalities of the List, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 81, 
82 (2014) (“The concept of assemblage has been rarely used in legal theory 
because its emphasis on materiality, distributed agency and heterogeneity 
challenges received notions of legal formalism and the way international norms 
are ordinarily thought to be constituted, transmitted and contained. Yet I suggest 
that it is precisely these qualities that provide the assemblage with analytical 
advantage in understanding how this listing regime functions in the 
transnational context.”). 
 82. Gráinne de Búrca et al., Global Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. 
POL. SCI. 477 passim (2014). 
 83. Id. at 481 (“Institutional inertia and political deadlock, the rise of non-
hierarchical organizations, and the proliferation of linkages between 
international organizations and civil society actors – all fomented by and 
contributing to greater uncertainty – have led to the emergence of a variety of 
higher-order governance arrangements, the most representative of which are 
regime complexes. . . . Regime complexes, including different mixes of states, sub-
state units, international organizations, civil society organizations and private 
actors, have in various issue areas replaced more tightly integrated international 
regimes . . . [and] have been identified in the areas of climate change, food 
security, refugee policy, energy, intellectual property and anti-corruption.”). 
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historical relation. The legal anthropologist, Mark Goodale, 
depicted the reality of increasing institutional and 
interactional complexity with regard to the post-WWII 
aspirations for a world-wide effective human rights system 
in the following manner: 
Eleanor Roosevelt, the chair of the inaugural United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, had hoped that a “curious 
grapevine” would eventually carry the idea of human rights into 
every corner of the world, so that the dizzying—and regressive—
diversity of rule-systems would be replaced by the exalted 
normative framework expressed through the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, the curious grapevine of non-
state and transnational actors did emerge in the way Roosevelt 
anticipated, but the resulting networks have been conduits for 
normativities in addition to human rights. Ideas, institutional 
practices, and policies justified through a range of distinct 
frameworks and assumptions—social justice, economic 
redistribution, human capabilities, citizen security, religious law, 
neo-laissez faire economics, and so on—come together at the same 
time within the transnational spaces through which the endemic 
social problems of our times are increasingly addressed.84 
What this suggests is that even a legal field whose 
appeal is so fundamentally based on its principled, non-
partisan, generalized normativity, “lives” in the tiniest detail 
of locally and substantively diverse and destabilizing 
struggles for rights.85 With a lively debate raging over the 
trajectory, possible futures as well as the possible exhaustion 
 
 84. Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and 
the Local, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE 
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 1, 3 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). 
 85. See, e.g., Helen Quane, Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights 
Law: Inherently Incompatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between?, 
33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 675, 677 (2013) (highlighting the tensions between 
international human rights law and legal pluralism). This is further illustrated 
by the analysis respectively provided by Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: 
Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 passim 
(1981), and Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical 
Reflections, in LAW IN TRANSITION: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 215 passim (Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen eds., 
2014). 
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of Human Rights,86 the significance of post-colonial theory 
interventions into both the imperialist dimensions and the 
epistemological underpinnings of human rights programs 
and applications today cannot be overestimated. And this 
has enormous consequences for both mainstream and critical 
projects with a deeply unsettled geopolitical geography 
across which “rights” and legal emancipatory projects forms 
a highly volatile backdrop for political movements of 
different ideological orientation. 
In light of this and with the benefit of legal-
anthropological and legal-sociological insights,87 questions 
regarding the type and orientation of a legal theory that can 
adequately capture such unstable assemblages of actors, 
norms, and processes88 pose themselves in a dim light. At 
once, such a legal theory would have to be able to both make 
sense of the spatial dimensions of specialized regulatory 
regimes and be sensitive and receptive to their local and 
never fixed idiosyncrasies. It would appear, then, that a 
suitably globally minded and locally grounded, critical legal 
theory must serve a number of functions. For one, it has to 
be an ordering framework through which the different 
building blocks that form part of border-crossing yet locally 
specific and diverse regulatory regimes can be accounted for 
and be made amenable for conceptual as well as practical 
use. In other words, such a legal theory needs to provide a 
platform on which to deliberate the conceptual coherence of 
the theory’s scope and normative orientation. This sounds 
more obscure than it has to, as we already have a number of 
comparable examples at our disposition, even in our 
allegedly well-known and settled, yet as such regularly 
underestimated, local and national realm of law and 
 
 86. And this debate has been newly fueled by Sam Moyn’s provocative 
intervention a few years ago: SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2012). 
 87. THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL 
AND THE LOCAL, supra note 84. 
 88. Zumbansen, supra passim note 76. 
944 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
jurisprudence:89 think of, for example, commercial law or 
property law, or of administrative or constitutional law. 
While the former two are within the core of what is generally 
considered “private law,” the latter belong squarely to the 
realm of “public law.” Each of these fields exists, in highly 
varied forms, “globally” and locally. It is the genius, one 
might say, of commercial law to provide an effective and 
comprehensive regulatory apparatus which spans both 
domestic and transnational dealings through an elaborate 
institutional and normative framework.90 But, the more 
recent beginnings of an emerging global value chain law91 
are unthinkable without the groundbreaking legal 
sociological work on standards and regulatory governance,92 
the study of what has been called “transnational private 
governance”93 and “transnational business governance 
interactions.”94 Private law and governance have been and 
 
 89. In that regard, see RODERICK A. MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW 
(2002); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Law in the Everyday Life of 
Women, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 109 passim (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns 
eds., 1995). 
 90. See, e.g., Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Explaining the Transnationalization 
of Commercial Law, in STATE TRANSFORMATION IN OECD COUNTRIES 127 passim 
(Heinz Rothgang & Steffen Schneider eds., 2015); Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, 2 CURRENT L. & SOC. PROBS. 
129 passim (1961). 
 91. Galit Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L. L. 
J. 419 passim (2015); Klaas Hendrik Eller, Private governance of global value 
chains from within: lessons from and for transnational law, 8 TRANSNAT’L. LEG. 
THEORY 296 passim (2017); Benedikt Reinke & Peer Zumbansen, Transnational 
Liability Regimes in Contract, Tort and Corporate Law: Comparative 
Observations on ‘Global Supply Chain Liability’, in LE DEVOIR DE LA VIGILANCE 
157 passim (Sophie Schiller ed., 2019), Manoj Dias-Abey, Using Law to Support 
Social Movement-Led Collective Bargaining Structures in Supply Chains, 32 
AUSTRALIAN. J. LAB. L. (forthcoming 2019), manuscript available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3400564. 
 92. Errol Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and 
Community, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123 passim (1999). 
 93. Graeme Auld et al., Transnational Private Governance Between the Logics 
of Empowerment and Control, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 108 passim (2015). 
 94. Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions: 
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. AND GOVERNANCE 1 
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continue to be crucial zones of conflict research for law and 
society scholars. See a further example, namely property 
law. It is the intricacy of that field to be all at once a core 
doctrinal component of private law, a central category in 
economic theory, an ideological token in development policy 
as well as a contested concept in political theory.95 Whereas 
private law appears to have a long pedigree as a more 
suitable candidate for transnationally minded law and 
society work, driven by private law’s operations’ and 
instruments’ border-crossing expansion and migration,96 we 
can witness a similar degree of spatialization in public law 
areas such as administrative and constitutional law.97 
And it is at that moment, where we can sense the 
growing suspicion that an amalgam such as TL 
(transnational and law) must somehow be connected to or 
become part of this congregation of disciplines, investigative 
strategies, heterogeneous research frameworks as well as 
advocacy options98 we are grappling with in light of a host of 
 
passim (2014). 
 95. Priya S. Gupta, Transnational Property Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen ed.) (forthcoming 2020). 
 96. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER passim (1996). 
 97. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 passim (2015). For an insightful, critical discussion, 
see B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative 
Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 passim (2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Paradigms 
of Public Law: Transnational Constitutional Values and Democratic Challenges, 
8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 517 passim (2010); and Sujith Xavier, Top Heavy: Beyond the 
Global North and the Justification for Global Administrative Law, 57 INDIAN J. 
INT’L L. 337 passim (2017). See also the important, critical interventions from the 
point of view of public international law, in particular, by Isabel Feichtner, 
Realizing Utopia Through the Practice of International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1143 passim (2012); and Christine Schwöbel-Patel, Populism, International Law, 
and the End of Keep Calm and Carry on Lawyering, NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300695. 
 98. Garrett W. Brown & Ronald Labonté, Globalization and Its 
Methodological Discontents: Contextualizing Globalization Through the Study of 
HIV/AIDS, 7 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1, 1–2 (2011) (“[T]raditional approaches 
to the study of globalization often fail to capture many facets involved within its 
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phenomena that are not only extremely wide-ranging and 
diverse, but also contested as to their underlying 
epistemologies and inherent ideologies. As such, TL brings 
us back the age-old question of “how and what law can 
know.” What we seem to still be working on, then, is a legal 
sociology of “the global.” Drawing on a wealth of distinct and 
inter-disciplinary work, the stakes of such an “ambitious” 
theory as a project of transnational “law” and transnational 
legal pluralism99 are high. Meanwhile, there are numerous 
auspicious beginnings and echoes of likeminded attempts. 
And, if post-colonial theory has “taught” us anything, we 
must acknowledge that a depiction of a “problem,” a “crisis,” 
and a particular “affectedness” is always part of a more 
comprehensive reference framework, whether its influence is 
directly felt or working implicitly. In the context of received 
and dominant “critical” social and political theory, the 
universe of references has for such long time been marked by 
distinctions between state and market, right and left, 
conservative, liberal, or progressive, that challenges, 
alternatives or interventions would regularly arise from 
within this field of tensions and options. Today, we see 
numerous initiatives of re-orientation and engagement with 
local knowledges and alternative frameworks.100 At the core 
of such transformations is what Dipesh Chakrabarty 
famously called “Provincializing,” the displacement of 
“Europe” as philosophical and epistemological starting 
 
multifarious and complex processes: that whatever globalization is, it is not 
something that is easily definable or reasonably encapsulated by a single trend 
(or bundle of trends) associated with global interconnection. It is more 
appropriate to think of globalization as a pluralistic phenomenon with 
indeterminate idiosyncrasies and anomalistic permutations.”) (citation omitted). 
 99. Zumbansen, Manifestations and Arguments, supra passim note 71; Peer 
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141 
passim (2010). 
 100. See, e.g., Garth Myers, The Africa Problem of Global Urban Theory: Re-
conceptualising Planetary Urbanisation, 10 INT’L DEV. POL’Y 231 passim (2019); 
see also Critical Theory in the Global South, Weinberg C. Arts & Science, 
https://www.criticaltheory.northwestern.edu/mellon-project/critical-theory-in-
the-global-south/ (last visited May 9, 2019). 
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point.101 As this call to arms is taken up in different fields,102 
the poignant revival of populism, racism and xenophobia 
seems to prompt yet other and as to their outcomes if not 
causes103 unpredictable reshufflings of political projects. 
What, then, from a Western perspective, might constitute 
“pressing” challenges in the shape of democratic 
governance,104 “dis-embedded” markets,105 the globalization 
of financial capitalism,106 and the seemingly unstoppable 
erosion of social safeguards,107 might be depicted very 
differently and with contrasting accentuations, explanations 
and allocations of (political, historical) agency from within 
different geopolitical but also alternative, “subaltern” 
framings. Already, when we start challenging, relativizing 
and decentering the usual state-law nexus which continues 
to be at the heart of many dominant depictions of a “crisis of 
 
 101. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT 
AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2d ed. 2007). 
 102. See, e.g., Pinar Bilgin, Looking for ‘the International’ Beyond the West, 31 
THIRD WORLD Q. 817 passim (2010); Yong-Soo Eun, Opening Up the Debate over 
‘Non-western’ International Relations, 39 POL. 4 passim (2018). 
 103. Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, 2018 J. INT’L 
BUS. POL’Y 12 (“Many of these consequences were predictable and are not a 
surprise. The same can be said about the political backlash as well. A number of 
empirical papers have linked the rise of populist movements –Trump and the 
right-wing Republicans in the US, Brexit in Britain, far-right groups in Europe 
– to forces associated with globalization, such as the China trade shock, rising 
import penetration levels, de-industrialization, and immigration.”). 
 104. Bruce Jones & Torrey Taussig, Democracy & Disorder: The Struggle for 
Influence in the New Geopolitics, BROOKINGS (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/ democracy-disorder-the-struggle-for-
influence-in-the-new-geopolitics/. 
 105. The notion goes back, of course, to KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION (1944). For a present-time engagement, see the contributions 
to KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL 
MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011). 
 106. Eric Helleiner, Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: 
Bringing States Back in, 2 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 315 passim (1995). 
 107. Gary Spolander et al., The Implications of Neoliberalism for Social Work: 
Reflections from a Six-country International Research Collaboration, 57 INT’L 
SOC. WORK 301 passim (2014). 
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law in an age of globalization,”108 a very different universe of 
reference points begins to emerge. Instead of confirming the 
prevailing viewpoint from which law is challenged through 
various attacks on state sovereignty due to the state’s 
willing/unwilling integration into global regulatory 
assemblages109 and the emergence of truly global problem 
areas,110 on the one hand, and through the proliferation of 
private, “non-state” actors in the context of norm creation,111 
on the other, we are confronted with deep-reaching 
challenges to the dominant characterizations of the normal 
and the exception. While some of these challenges manifest 
themselves under the umbrella of a post-colonial critique of 
(Western) law,112 or—to take the example of public 
 
 108. See, e.g., Eric C. Ip, Globalization and the Future of the Law of the 
Sovereign State, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 637 (2010) (“Two major developments 
highlight the international legal system’s partial withdrawal from its established 
state-centric orientation and its embrace of globally relevant concerns: the 
proliferation of specialized regimes of international law, which extend into major 
domestic policy areas, and the rising prominence of transnational regulatory 
regimes enacted by nonstate actors. The rise of nonstate regulation of issues 
previously monopolized by state legal control raises important questions about 
the future of state law.”). 
 109. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER passim (2004); Jonathan I. 
Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 529 (1993), 529 (“In 
this shrinking world, states are increasingly interdependent and interconnected, 
a development that has affected international law.”). 
 110. Frank Biermann et al., The Fragmentation of Global Governance 
Architectures: A Framework for Analysis, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 14, 16 (2009) 
(“[T]he notion of global governance architecture in particular for this reason: 
because it allows for the analysis of (the many) policy domains in international 
relations that are not regulated, and often not even dominated, by a single 
international regime in the traditional understanding. Many policy domains are 
instead marked by a patchwork of international institutions that are different in 
their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies 
(public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their 
subject matter (from special policy fields to universal concerns).”). 
 111. Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of Transnational 
Private Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 163 passim (2011). 
 112. Eve Darian-Smith, Postcolonial Theories of Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL 
THEORY (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds. 2d ed. 2013); Alpana Roy, 
Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADELAIDE L. REV. 315 
(2008). 
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international law, which has been exposed to an important 
critique of its colonial and imperialist legacies, for example 
under the auspices of the so-called “Third World Approaches 
to International Law” (TWAIL)113—their critical and 
transformative significance is greater still. As argued at the 
beginning of this paper, their significance is as much 
political114 as it is epistemological.115 While the former 
 
 113. James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its 
Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26, 30 
(2011) (“TWAIL scholarship, more than any other scholarly approach to 
international law, has brought the colonial encounter between Europeans and 
non-Europeans to the center of this historical re-examination of international 
law. In doing so, TWAIL scholarship has not only rethought international law’s 
relationship to the colonial encounter, but has also challenged the complacency 
in international law to treat the colonial legacy as dead letter, overcome by the 
process of decolonization.”); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Critical Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?, 10 
INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371, 373 (2008) (“Regarding it predictive-ness, much 
TWAIL scholarship tends to off er windows into international law’s tomorrow. 
Drawing from the empirical history of international law’s engagement with third 
world peoples, such scholarship tends to imagine and predict the ways in which 
international law will behave toward the ‘third world’ (or some part thereof) in 
the near and long term.”). 
 114. Eve Darian-Smith, Postcolonialism: A Brief Introduction, 5 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 291, 292 (1996) (“[P]ostcolonialism operates as a chronological marker and 
method of periodization. It optimistically suggests the transcendence of 
nineteenth-century imperialism, and a greater balancing of respective political 
and economic power between the West and developing countries. This temporal 
approach to postcolonialism is explicitly political since it involves contested 
interpretations of what it does and does not represent.”); James Thuo Gathii, 
Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the 
International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 1997 
(2000) (“This third-world approach thus not only disrupts the hegemonic 
approaches to the study of international law, but also partly embodies the 
political goals of the third world, as I see them. It is thus as legal as it is 
political.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From 
Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges, 30 REV. 45, 51 (2007) (“the colonial zone 
is, par excellence, the realm of incomprehensible beliefs and behaviours which in 
no way can be considered knowledge, whether true or false. The other side of the 
line harbours only incomprehensible magical or idolatrous practices. The utter 
strangeness of such practices led to denying the very human nature of the agents 
of such practices. On the basis of their refined conceptions of humanity and 
human dignity, the humanists reached the conclusion that the savages were 
subhuman.”); see also Walter D. Mignolo, The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the 
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results in radically “complicating” the role that law, its 
doctrines, its concepts as well as the legal profession itself, 
are being asked to occupy in the world,116 the latter points to 
the potential of calling into question and destabilizing the 
entirety of the Western liberal legal paradigm in its 
intertwinement with a long and bloody trajectory of 
imperialist and, eventually, neoliberal expansion.117 And, 
the critique goes to the core as it not only aims at uncovering 
the victims, the bloodshed and the collateral damage of 
liberal law’s travels into far-flung corners of the world, but 
targets colonialist and exclusionary legal effects within 
domestic, local legal cultures and instruments.118 It does so 
 
Colonial Difference, 101 SOUTH ATLANTIC Q. 57, 67 (“Epistemology is not 
ahistorical. But not only that, it cannot be reduced to the linear history from 
Greek to contemporary North Atlantic knowledge production. It has to be 
geographical in its historicity by bringing the colonial difference into the game.”). 
 116. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 50–51 (2000) (“The logic of legal 
discourse yields a particular interpretation of events, but that interpretation is 
invariably susceptible to challenge from what may be called a political 
perspective. . . . Between the naïve belief that political events can be understood 
entirely in terms of legal discourse and the blind conviction that the normative 
world of law can be dismissed as empty rhetoric, there remains a multiplicity of 
perspectives which might be advanced.”); see also PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW 
ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 128 (1990) (“Time and space are thus a consequence of 
the human being’s ability to conceive the world in consciousness and to conceive 
of it as a world of possible willing and acting.”). 
 117. GRIETJE BAARS, THE CORPORATION, LAW, AND CAPITALISM: A RADICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY passim 
(2019); PARFITT, supra passim note 51; Robert J.C. Young, What is the 
Postcolonial?, 40 ARIEL 13, 14 (2009) (“Postcolonialism’s concerns are centered 
on geographic zones of intensity that have remained largely invisible, but which 
prompt or involve questions of history, ethnicity, complex cultural identities and 
questions of representation, of refugees, emigration and immigration, of poverty 
and wealth—but also, importantly, the energy, vibrancy and creative cultural 
dynamics that emerge in very positive ways from such demanding circumstances. 
Postcolonialism offers a language of and for those who have no place, who seem 
not to belong, of those whose knowledges and histories are not allowed to count. 
It is above all this preoccupation with the oppressed, with the subaltern classes, 
with minorities in any society, with the concerns of those who live or come from 
elsewhere, that constitutes the basis of postcolonial politics and remains the core 
that generates its continuing power.”). 
 118. See, e.g., John Borrows, With or Without You: First Nations Law (in 
Canada), 41 MCGILL L.J. 629 passim (1996); Monique Mann & Angela Daly, (Big) 
2019] PROSPECTS FOR “LAW AND SOCIETY” 951 
through a scrutiny, engagement, often also a refutation of 
inherited, canonical views of how “the law” has evolved as 
part of the “progress” of human society, and it is here where 
the merits and, indeed, the importance of postcolonial legal 
theory engage and challenge assertions of state power and 
“resistance,”119 of “center and periphery”120 as well as of 
progress, civilization and modernity121 and culminate in a 
critique of the all-pervading “coloniality of being.”122 As 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres highlighted, 
Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a 
political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation 
or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such 
nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing 
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that 
define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge 
production well beyond the strict limits of colonial 
administration.123 
An important tenet of the coloniality critique, then, is to 
identify and expose the black holes within and the gaps 
between these different narratives—both within the 
explicitly outward-oriented, expansionist, and 
interventionist colonializing context and within core liberal 
 
Data and the North-in-South: Australia’s Informational Imperialism and Digital 
Colonialism, TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA (forthcoming 2019) (“Despite Australia’s 
geographical position within the Asia-Pacific, and the enduring presence and 
richness of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures, Australia’s social and 
political backdrop neglects these in favor of Northern/Western influences, 
thereby perpetuating the marginalization of Indigenous peoples.”). 
 119. B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799, 804 (2006). 
 120. Arjun Appadurai, Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery, 28 
COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 356 passim (1986). 
 121. Aníbal Quijano, Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality, 21 CULTURAL 
STUD. 168, 172 (2007) (“Such confluence between coloniality and the elaboration 
of rationality/modernity was not in any way accidental, as is shown by the very 
manner in which the European paradigm of rational knowledge was 
elaborated.”). 
 122. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to 
the Development of a Concept, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 240 passim (2007). 
 123. Id. at 243. 
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doctrines in the here and now of Western law.124 By directing 
critical attention to ideas such as contract, consent, and 
autonomy and to the way they play out in the context of legal 
and judicial interpretation and re-affirmation, it becomes 
possible to identify the structural violence of such 
universalizing concepts vis-à-vis the vulnerability of 
marginalized groups.125 It is here, where the postcolonial 
historical assessment of the “where” and the “who dunnit?” 
becomes crucial126—while now no longer being confined to 
the countries to which we attribute the label “de-
colonized.”127 Legal history becomes an important battlefield 
 
 124. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW passim (2005). 
 125. Anne O’Connell, My Entire Life is Online: Informed Consent, Big Data, 
and Decolonial Knowlegde, 5 INTERSECTIONALITIES 68, 70 (2016) (“Many of our 
institutional and government responses to ethical concerns are instrumental 
approaches for the ‘how to’ of consent, autonomy, and privacy. While online and 
digital research protocols are being introduced in relation to these issues, the 
foundational questions about the communities we want to live in persist. . . . 
What kind of ethics are we moving toward when our face-to-face encounters are 
computer mediated, while the body itself is increasingly compartmentalized, 
exteriorized, and commodified through a tissue economy that includes biobanks, 
transplant tourism, the human genome project, and reproductive technologies? 
In an age of increased abstractions, how do categories of race and racisms appear 
less visible or hyper-visible, with little interrogation into the concrete ways they 
are formed and used to organize knowledge production and ways of ruling?”) 
(citations omitted); see also Anne O’Connell, Building Their Readiness for 
Economic “Freedom”: The New Poor Law and Emancipation, 36 J. SOC. & SOC. 
WELFARE 85 passim (2009). 
 126. See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, Conflicting Conceptions of Human Rights: 
Rethinking the Post-Colonial State, 89 PROC. ANN. MEETING 487, 487 (1995) (“It 
is becoming increasingly apparent that sovereignty and statehood are concepts 
that may have trapped Africa in a detrimental time capsule; they now seem to be 
straightjackets with time bombs ready to explode. The imposition of the nation-
state through colonization balkanized Africa into ahistorical units and forcibly 
yanked it into the Age of Europe, permanently disfiguring it. Unlike their 
European counterparts, African states and borders are distinctly artificial and 
are not the visible expression of historical struggles by local peoples to achieve 
political adjustment and balance. Colonization interrupted this historical and 
evolutionary process.”). 
 127. For a riveting analysis of the gap between the “legal” and the 
“political”/“economic” decolonization on the part of formerly colonized states after 
WWII, see SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
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on which competing and opposing narratives get tested 
against the background of their incorporated assumptions 
and deeply held beliefs.128 Post-colonial as coloniality 
critique unfolds in a repeated calling-into-question of 
generally accepted ascriptions of historical reason and 
meaning. In that regard Walter Mignolo observed: 
That “civilization” is somewhat related to “globalization” and 
“modern/colonial world system” is obvious. How it is related is not 
obvious. I submit that the colonial difference is one of the missing 
links between civilization, modernization, and modern/colonial 
world system.129 
Whether, in addition to our earlier observations 
regarding the underlying racism of the “war on terror,” we 
highlight just two areas of considerable contention, it is the 
idea of human rights being “universal” in contrast to 
pluralist, subaltern human rights conceptions,130 or whether 
 
 128. See the account by Renato Ortiz, Notas sobre la problemática de la 
globalisacíon de las sociedades, 41 DIÁLOGOS DE COMUNICACÍON (1995), 
http://dialogosfelafacs.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/41/NOTAS-SOBRE-LA-
PROBLEMATICA-DE-LA-GLOBALIZAC ION-DE-LAS-SOCIEDADES.pdf (“Es 
el caso cuando hablamos de relaciones internacionales. Esta noción presupone la 
existencia de naciones autónomas interactuando entre sí. La dinámica global 
derivaría de movimiento de las partes. Cada una de ellas, en su integridad 
actuaría en el contexto mundial. Las mismas premisas subyacer a los conceptos 
de colonialismo y de imperialismo. En cada uno de ellos destacamos un centro (el 
imperio o la nación industrializada) como elemento propulsor de movimiento de 
expansión. El mundo sería así el cruzamiento de las diversas intenciones, 
transimperiales o transnacionales que, de forma diferenciada incidirían en las 
colonias o en los países periféricos. Una aplicación común de este tipo de 
raciocinio es la comparación entre el momento actual y algunos periodos de la 
historia pasada. Por ejemplo, la analogía de la ascención y la caída de un país, 
como los Estados Unidos, a la del Imperio Romano. En los dos casos tenemos la 
expansión de una civilización, norteamericana o romana, de una lengua, el inglés 
o el latin, hacia un conjunto de territorios apartados de su núcleo irradiador. Las 
relaciones de contacto entre esta «periferia» y el «centro» se harían por tanto de 
acuerdo con normas de dominación elaboradas por los países o por los imperios 
colonizadores.”). 
 129. WALTER MIGNOLO, LOCAL HISTORIES/GLOBAL DESIGNS. COLONIALITY, 
SUBALTERN KNOWLEDGES, AND BORDER THINKING 278 (2000). 
 130. See, for example, the seminal text by C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: 
TOUSSAINT L’OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION passim (Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1989) (1963); and, more recently, one of the foundational works in 
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we are concerned with the contention that it is the central 
role of “the state” not only to contain and to administer the 
legal order but also to be “reservoir” of the people and of a 
democratic populace,131 the post-colonialist critique goes to 
the roots of dominant historical narratives and central tenets 
of Western law. A central focus of critique in this regard is 
the perpetuated distinction between a “European” law, 
existing in a timeless and immaterial, abstract space of 
universal validity and the various localities of “non-
European” peoples in which underdeveloped, non-
enlightened custom and tradition prevailed.132 As recently 
 
the TWAIL movement: ANGHIE, supra passim note 124. But see and Rebecca 
Adami, On Subalternity and Representation: Female and Post Colonial Subjects 
Claiming Universal Human Rights in 1948, 6 J. RES. WOMEN & GENDER 56, 58 
(2015) (“United Nations delegates from non-Western and Western societies met 
on an international arena and agreed to disagree on the values that underscore 
the moral justification of the universality of human rights. Human rights were 
referred to as practical principles, compatible with divergent cultural value 
systems. What was under critical consideration in the United Nations by the 
delegates in 1948 was the disrespect of human rights in national legislation 
around the world, in Western as well as non-Western countries.”); Ben Golder, 
Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Legal Thought, 2 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 77, 79 (2014) 
(“When operating in this mode, much critical theorising about human rights 
actually ends up attempting to reimagine (and in doing so, reinforce) the human 
rights project itself. After having exposed its false claims to universality, its 
investment in and reproduction of a narrow liberal ontology, its propensity to 
circumscribe the field and possibility of politics, its inability to break with global 
capitalist ordering, its indebtedness to and repetition of colonial history, and a 
host of other related criticisms (in short: the critique of human rights as a 
particular form of Western political liberalism that gets exported globally with 
great violence), critical commentators on human rights nevertheless make a 
curious return to human rights. In this post-critical redemptive guise, human 
rights emerge in spite of their evident historical and political limitations as the 
site of reinvestment, reimagining and of futural possibilities.”). 
 131. See, for a critique, Makau wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An 
Essential Symbiosis, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 149, 166–
67(Michael Byers ed., 2000) (“There are fundamental defects in presenting the 
State as the reservoir of cultural heritage. Many States have been alien to their 
populations and it is questionable whether they represent those populations or 
whether they are little more than internationally recognized cartels for the sake 
of maintaining power and access to resources.”). 
 132. ANGHIE, supra note 124, at 5 (“European states were sovereign and equal. 
The colonial confrontation, however, particularly since the nineteenth century 
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observed by Kiran Grewal, an important aspect of 
International Law’s colonizing intervention was its line-
drawing between an allegedly universal center and a local 
periphery, which would be identified as target of a 
civilizational mission: 
Part of the problem has been the production of a binary between the 
enlightened space of “abstract universal law” and the specifically 
located site of (“non-Western”) culture and tradition. International 
law has in this way been both claimed to reflect the embodiment of 
“Western” Enlightenment principles and simultaneously abstracted 
to assert a universal applicability.133 
A crucial dimension of the postcolonial critique is its ability 
to expose continuities and recurrences of colonialist 
categories up into the present-day exclusionary politics in 
the context of migration governance,134 racialized policing,135 
 
when colonialism reached its apogee, was not a confrontation between two 
sovereign states, but rather between a sovereign European state and a non-
European society that was deemed by jurists to be lacking in sovereignty – or 
else, at best only partially sovereign.”). 
 133. Kiran Grewal, Can the Subaltern Speak Within International Law? 
Women’s Rights Activism, International Legal Institutions and the Power of 
‘Strategic Misunderstanding’, in NEGOTIATING NORMATIVITY 27, 28 (N. Dhawan 
et al. eds., 2016). 
 134. See Ratna Kapur, The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties, 
Law, and the Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 537, 
539 (2007) (“The subaltern is not merely a marginalized subject or a minority 
member, as understood within the terms of classical liberal thinking. The 
subaltern emerges from the specific ways in which the liberal project and 
imperialism operated during the colonial encounter, exposing the ‘dark side’ of 
the liberal project and its exclusionary potential. The insights provided by the 
colonial past enable us to understand the operation of power through knowledge 
and how it sets the terms of inclusion and exclusion in the postcolonial present, 
though this understanding is not confined to postcolonial states.”). See also RATNA 
KAPUR, MAKESHIFT MIGRANTS AND LAW: GENDER, BELONGING, AND POSTCOLONIAL 
ANXIETIES (2010). 
 135. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT passim (2017). See 
also, for a slightly less pessimistic view, Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: 
The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 982 (2017) (“Data-driven policing is 
being offered as a partial antidote to racially discriminatory practices in police 
departments across the country. However, although part of the appeal of big data 
lies in its promise of less discretionary and more objective decision-making, new 
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and the “war on terror”—without confining its investigation 
to historically colonized states. As before in the cases of law 
and development,136 critical comparative law,137 and certain 
strands of legal pluralism,138 it is through postcolonial legal 
theory’s inward-turn that it becomes possible not only to see 
“the South in the North”139 but to hereby also gain a more 
adequate grasp of colonial continuities as well as a platform 
on which to resist140 the neocolonial regulatory dynamics 
unfolding in “settler colonial” states.141 
 
analytic platforms and techniques are deployed in preexisting organizational 
contexts and embody the purposes of their creators. Therefore, it remains an open 
empirical question to what extent the adoption of advanced analytics will reduce 
organizational inefficiencies and inequalities, or serve to entrench power 
dynamics within organizations.”) (citations omitted). 
 136. Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development 
Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195 passim (2000); David 
M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. 
REV. 1062 passim. 
 137. Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative 
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 passim (1985); Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s 
Coming of Age? Twenty Years After ‘Critical Comparisons’, 6 GER. L.J. 1073 
passim (2005). 
 138. Sally Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869 (1988) (“The 
intellectual odyssey of the concept of legal pluralism moves from the discovery of 
indigenous forms of law among remote African villagers and New Guinea 
tribesmen to debates concerning the pluralistic qualities of law under advanced 
capitalism.”); Geoffrey Swenson, Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice, 20 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 438, 445 (2018) (“Legal pluralism does not disappear in a state with 
a high-capacity, effective legal system, but it is complementary. In other words, 
nonstate is subordinated and structured by the state because the state enjoys 
both the legitimacy to have its rule accepted and the capacity to actually enforce 
its mandates.”). 
 139. Amar Bhatia, The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to 
International Law with Lessons from the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 131 
passim (2012). 
 140. GLEN SEAN COULTHARD, RED SKIN WHITE MASKS: REJECTING THE COLONIAL 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 3 (2014) (“I argue that instead of ushering in an era of 
peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of reciprocity or mutual recognition, 
the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce 
the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that 
Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to 
transcend.”). 
 141. Adrian A. Smith, Temporary Labour Migration and the “Ceremony of 
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The proliferation of postcolonial legal theory—despite its 
lingering at the outer periphery of mainstream legal thought 
(and, pedagogy)142—has the potential of fundamentally 
challenging the universalist and abstract assumptions of law 
in both theoretical and, indeed, highly practical terms.143 
Both in a wide range of specialized legal sub-fields and in the 
increasingly unruly realm of “legal theory” can we witness a 
breathtaking intensification of law’s engagement with and, 
subsequently, its transformation through inter-
disciplinarity, politics, history, and social theory.144 This is a 
crucial moment for a critical methodology project such as 
transnational law as here understood. By decentering the 
still dominant emphasis in contemporary legal theory 
debates on the law/non-law distinction and, instead, turning 
towards the elaboration of transnational law as a 
methodology of law and its attending actors, norms and 
processes in a global context it should become possible to free 
law—transnational and otherwise—from the suffocating 
grip of positivist jurisprudence and to restart a critical 
engagement with the complexities of law as a multifaceted 
assemblage of social ordering. 
 
Innocence” of Postwar Labour Law: Confronting “the South of the North”, 33 
CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 261, 274 (2018) (“Just as Canada’s migration approach 
functions in ways consistent with colonialism, it too performs the work of settler 
colonial hyper-exploitation, displacement and dispossession. The production of 
migrant labour occurs as a basis for preserving if not deepening the colonial 
settlement project in Canada.”). ERAKAT and AMARA, KEDAR & YIFTACHEL, 
passim. 
 142. For a promising counter-point, see Paul Jonathan Saguil, Ethical 
Lawyering Across Canada’s Legal Traditions, 9 INDIGENOUS L.J. 167 passim 
(2010). But see John Strawson, Orientalism and Legal Education in the Middle 
East: Reading Frederic Goadby’s Introduction to the Study of Law, 21 LEGAL 
STUD. 663 passim (2001). 
 143. See, e.g., Mark Goodale & Sally Merry eds., THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL passim (Mark 
Goodale & Sally Merry eds., 2007). 
 144. An impressive display of such a comprehensive approach can be found in 
ANOTHER KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE: BEYOND NORTHERN EPISTEMOLOGIES 
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2005); and more recently in LAW AND SOCIETY 
IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW MAP (César Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2015). 
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IV. T.I.N.A., STILL? RESISTING LAW’S NEOLIBERALISM 
Where does this leave us? Or, in other words: are the 
current signs promising or cause for further despair? As the 
present-day critique engages and attacks law in its multi-
dimensional constitution as discipline, as doctrinal 
framework, as theory and as practice, we can slowly begin to 
appreciate the stakes if not futility of any attempt at 
achieving something like a comprehensive survey, 
exhaustive analysis, or conclusive assessment. Instead, what 
becomes apparent is the sheer enormity of the task of 
identifying and deciphering the various dimensions of law in 
its multifarious instantiations in today’s global, neoliberal, 
neo-colonial, and digitalized context. The question which we 
thus posed ourselves in this Paper concerned the “what” and, 
ultimately, the “how” of an appropriate legal intervention in 
the present moment. 
The continuing expansion of transnational law—TL—
prompts us to reflect on the place and role of law within the 
wider context of a legal critique of “globalization.” As already 
alluded to, the here-taken approach is one of using post-
colonial legal theory as part of a critical transnational law 
project to develop  a conceptual laboratory in which we must 
ask hard questions regarding “law’s” co-existence with and, 
eventually, difference from other, non-legal normative orders 
and about the relation of (positivist) “law” and (legal 
pluralist) law to “the state.” To be clear, this is not only a 
task prompted by law’s “globalization,” that is, by the 
growing fragmentation of regulatory and “self-regulatory” 
orders beyond nation-state boundaries. A post-colonial 
project of transnational law as critical methodology rejects 
the separation between distinctly insulated domestic and 
international realms of law. Instead, it posits that law should 
be conceived through the lens of legal pluralism in order to 
more adequately recognize the fluid and changing states of 
legal orders, the diversity of norms as well as the multitude 
of actors involved in their generation and dissemination. A 
closer scrutiny, finally, of the processes through which norms 
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evolve, is bound to unsettle existing and dominant narratives 
of authority, sovereignty and legitimacy. The reference to as 
such idiosyncratic, historically and geographically particular 
emergences of a principle such as “the rule of law” should be 
the starting point for a sensible comparative analysis, not the 
foundation on which to distinguish between developed and 
developing, modern, civilized and “primitive” societies. 
Can legal theory, can legal scholarship, as it were, be 
trusted to successfully engage in such questions? It seems 
evident, that we have to interrogate the disciplinary status 
of legal theory in relation to “other” social sciences in order 
to maintain an open line of communication between a project 
such as this one and the longstanding and varied scholarly 
engagement with legal positivism, legal pluralism and 
globalization. In this process, each instance of a critical 
engagement with a pressing legal-regulatory issue in the 
global context contributes to the intensification of a 
transnational legal theory at a time, in which the jury still is 
out with regard to its verdict on whether transnational law 
should be considered a field, a concept, or a (likely pro-
market, neoliberal) ideology. Casting doubts on TL either in 
terms of being a neatly demarcated and regularly 
adjudicated area of doctrinal law or be seen as a conceptual 
elaboration which we would locate somewhere between 
private and public international law,145 we have to take 
seriously the lingering and persistent claims which situate 
and, arguably, reject TL as being, above all, a systematizing 
justificatory framework that smoothly suits an intensifying 
constellation of globalized markets. Acknowledging the 
weight of such assumptions, we not only need to reconsider 
law’s and legal theory’s receptivity to normative critique but 
also trace, more carefully, the lines of these longstanding 
concerns about TL. In the first instance, TL seems to have 
forever been prompting negative reactions to what is 
believed to be its fundamentally neo-liberal normative 
 
 145. See JESSUP, supra note 69, at 2–3. 
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orientation. Often understood as a field of law embodying the 
neoliberal roll-back of state-based, democratically generated 
legal institutions, rights and safe-guards in favor of a system 
in which the “winner takes all” and where law, along with 
other power-sustaining institutional frameworks, merely 
serves to empower a small fraction of society, TL appears to 
have been off to a bad start. Through an engagement with 
these concerns and by proposing a reassessment of legal 
theory in the context of critical social and political theory, the 
future will show to which degree post-colonial TL can provide 
a robust methodological framework for a critical legal theory 
in today’s global, neoliberal constellation. 
